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Manage App Inbound Hooks

ingest
Destructive

A v2 app's inbound catch-hooks (inbound-webhooks). A catch-hook lets an external system such as Stripe, Zapier, Make, Home Assistant or an email router POST JSON to a secret URL that writes into a declared collection, so the app receives data with no agent online. Hooks are declared in the manifest (x-homespun-manifest.ingest) and materialized at deploy, so this tool has no create or delete: it reads back the URL, rotates a leaked one, and manages the opt-in signing secret. After deploying a manifest that declares a hook, list is what yields the exact URL to paste into the external system. Actions: list returns the app's hooks, each with its full secret URL, current rule collection, mode, wake and handshake settings, per-status delivery counts and signing-secret state; rotate mints a fresh URL secret for one hook by name and returns the new url once, after which the old url stops working immediately with no redeploy needed; set_signing_secret provisions or rotates a hook's signing secret, which is a different secret from the URL and is what a provider HMACs the body with, minting one returned once when secret is omitted or storing a provider value verbatim when it is passed, and never echoing it back; clear_signing_secret removes it. Signature verification currently ships dark: nothing verifies a signature yet.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
nameNorotate / set_signing_secret / clear_signing_secret. The manifest ingest hook name (an x-homespun-manifest.ingest[].name). See list's `name` field.
actionYeslist: the app's inbound catch-hooks, each with its full secret URL, current rule (collection/mode/wake/handshake), and per-status delivery counts (app_id). rotate: mint a fresh URL secret for one hook and return its new URL once, invalidating the old URL immediately (app_id+name). set_signing_secret: provision or rotate a hook's opt-in signing secret, distinct from the URL secret (it is what a provider HMACs the body with); omit `secret` to mint one (returned once) or pass `secret` to store a provider-generated value verbatim (never echoed) (app_id+name). clear_signing_secret: remove a hook's signing secret (app_id+name).
app_idYesThe app id.
secretNoset_signing_secret only. A provider-generated signing secret to store verbatim (the Stripe path). Omit to have the relay mint one (the GitHub path), returned once in the response.
grace_secondsNoset_signing_secret only. On a rotation, how long the previous secret stays valid so deliveries verify while you update the provider (default 3600, max 86400).

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description adds behavioral context beyond the destructiveHint annotation: rotate invalidates the old URL immediately with no redeploy, set_signing_secret never echoes a stored secret, and 'Signature verification currently ships dark: nothing verifies a signature yet.' These are valuable, honest disclosures that the annotations alone do not provide.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is a long, dense paragraph. While it contains important context, the action summary duplicates the schema's action enum descriptions almost verbatim, which is redundant for an agent that can already read the schema. The structure is not broken into bullets or sections, making it harder to scan.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a tool with no output schema, the description covers return behavior well: list returns full URLs and settings, rotate returns a new URL once, set_signing_secret mints or stores a secret and never echoes it, and clear_signing_secret removes it. It also explains the overall relationship to manifests and deploys, making the tool's context complete for an AI agent.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The schema already provides 100% parameter coverage with detailed descriptions for action, name, secret, and grace_seconds. The description largely repeats the schema's action semantics (e.g., 'mint a fresh URL secret for one hook... invalidating the old URL immediately') rather than adding new parameter-level meaning. It adds contextual examples (Stripe, Zapier) but does not enhance parameter understanding beyond the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly identifies the tool as managing a v2 app's inbound catch-hooks (inbound-webhooks), explicitly stating the three key operations: reading back the URL, rotating a leaked URL, and managing the opt-in signing secret. It distinguishes itself from sibling CRUD/row tools by stating it has no create or delete capability.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description says when to use the tool: 'After deploying a manifest that declares a hook, list is what yields the exact URL to paste into the external system.' It also explicitly says 'this tool has no create or delete,' which is a clear when-not. However, it does not name specific alternative sibling tools, so it stops short of full explicit alternatives.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Most tools are clearly distinct, with row operations (list, get, upsert, update, delete, restore) well separated. Some boundaries like apps vs deploy_app and credentials vs grants require careful reading, but descriptions resolve the overlap.

Naming Consistency2/5

Tool names mix resource nouns (apps, attachments, connections) with verb_noun actions (delete_row, deploy_app). Singular and plural forms are inconsistent, and there is no uniform pattern across the set.

Tool Count3/5

24 tools is on the heavy side, but the platform's breadth (app deployment, data, auth, community) justifies the count. Each tool has a distinct role, though the set slightly exceeds the typical well-scoped range.

Completeness4/5

The surface covers the full app lifecycle: deploy, manage, delete, row CRUD with restore, attachments, credentials, and community features. Minor gaps like no dedicated row search or outbound webhook management are workable via existing tools.