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Manage App Inbound Hooks

ingest
Destructive

A v2 app's inbound catch-hooks (inbound-webhooks). A catch-hook lets an external system such as Stripe, Zapier, Make, Home Assistant or an email router POST JSON to a secret URL that writes into a declared collection, so the app receives data with no agent online. Hooks are declared in the manifest (x-homespun-manifest.ingest) and materialized at deploy, so this tool has no create or delete: it reads back the URL, rotates a leaked one, and manages the opt-in signing secret. After deploying a manifest that declares a hook, list is what yields the exact URL to paste into the external system. Actions: list returns the app's hooks, each with its full secret URL, current rule collection, mode, wake and handshake settings, per-status delivery counts and signing-secret state; rotate mints a fresh URL secret for one hook by name and returns the new url once, after which the old url stops working immediately with no redeploy needed; set_signing_secret provisions or rotates a hook's signing secret, which is a different secret from the URL and is what a provider HMACs the body with, minting one returned once when secret is omitted or storing a provider value verbatim when it is passed, and never echoing it back; clear_signing_secret removes it. Signature verification currently ships dark: nothing verifies a signature yet.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
nameNorotate / set_signing_secret / clear_signing_secret. The manifest ingest hook name (an x-homespun-manifest.ingest[].name). See list's `name` field.
actionYeslist: the app's inbound catch-hooks, each with its full secret URL, current rule (collection/mode/wake/handshake), and per-status delivery counts (app_id). rotate: mint a fresh URL secret for one hook and return its new URL once, invalidating the old URL immediately (app_id+name). set_signing_secret: provision or rotate a hook's opt-in signing secret, distinct from the URL secret (it is what a provider HMACs the body with); omit `secret` to mint one (returned once) or pass `secret` to store a provider-generated value verbatim (never echoed) (app_id+name). clear_signing_secret: remove a hook's signing secret (app_id+name).
app_idYesThe app id.
secretNoset_signing_secret only. A provider-generated signing secret to store verbatim (the Stripe path). Omit to have the relay mint one (the GitHub path), returned once in the response.
grace_secondsNoset_signing_secret only. On a rotation, how long the previous secret stays valid so deliveries verify while you update the provider (default 3600, max 86400).

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed2 schema fields changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / action / description
      Previous value: -"list: the app's inbound catch-hooks, each with its full secret URL, current rule (collection/mode/wake/handshake), and per-status delivery counts (app_id). rotate: mint a fresh URL secret for one hook and return its new URL once, invalidating the old URL immediately (app_id+name). set_signing_secret: provision or rotate a hook's OPT-IN signing secret, distinct from the URL secret (it is what a provider HMACs the body with); omit `secret` to mint one (returned ONCE) or pass `secret` to store a provider-generated value verbatim (never echoed) (app_id+name). clear_signing_secret: remove a hook's signing secret (app_id+name)."New value: +"list: the app's inbound catch-hooks, each with its full secret URL, current rule (collection/mode/wake/handshake), and per-status delivery counts (app_id). rotate: mint a fresh URL secret for one hook and return its new URL once, invalidating the old URL immediately (app_id+name). set_signing_secret: provision or rotate a hook's opt-in signing secret, distinct from the URL secret (it is what a provider HMACs the body with); omit `secret` to mint one (returned once) or pass `secret` to store a provider-generated value verbatim (never echoed) (app_id+name). clear_signing_secret: remove a hook's signing secret (app_id+name)."
    • changedInput schema / properties / secret / description
      Previous value: -"set_signing_secret only. A provider-generated signing secret to store verbatim (the Stripe path). Omit to have the relay mint one (the GitHub path), returned ONCE in the response."New value: +"set_signing_secret only. A provider-generated signing secret to store verbatim (the Stripe path). Omit to have the relay mint one (the GitHub path), returned once in the response."
  2. First observed

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already flag destructiveHint=true and non-idempotent, but the description adds far more: the old URL stops working immediately with no redeploy after rotate, secrets are returned once and never echoed back, signing secret is distinct from the URL secret, and signature verification currently ships dark. This is exactly the operational context an agent needs before a destructive mutation.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with what a catch-hook is, then the no-create/delete rationale, then a compact per-action breakdown — the ordering is sensible and dense. It is long and the trailing note about signature verification shipping dark is useful but slightly tangential to invocation.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description still covers returns: list yields URLs, rule settings, per-status delivery counts and signing-secret state, while rotate and set_signing_secret return the new secret exactly once. Nothing an agent needs to call this correctly or interpret results is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents every parameter, including the action enum and the required app_id+name pairings. The description's prose largely restates those same field semantics, adding only the conceptual split between URL secret and signing secret, so baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb set and resource: managing a v2 app's inbound catch-hooks (inbound-webhooks), with each action enumerated. It also explicitly distinguishes itself from siblings by explaining that hooks are declared in the manifest and materialized at deploy, so there is no create or delete here.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives clear when-to-use guidance per action: list is what yields the exact URL to paste into an external system after deploying a manifest, rotate is for a leaked URL, set_signing_secret for provisioning/rotating the opt-in HMAC secret. It also names the implicit alternative (declare in manifest / deploy) rather than this tool.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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