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List suppressions

list_suppressions
Read-onlyIdempotent

List suppressed recipient addresses.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
emailNoOptional filter by email
limitNoPage size (1–100)
cursorNoOpaque cursor for the next page
tenantNoList this tenant's own suppression list instead of the account's. The tenant's external id (your id for that customer) or its Groundmail id

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
dataYesSuppressed addresses on this page
has_moreNoTrue when another page of results is available
next_cursorNoCursor to pass as `cursor` to fetch the next page; null on the last page

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed2 schema fields changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / tenant
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "List this tenant's own suppression list instead of the account's. The tenant's external id (your id for that customer) or its Groundmail id",
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
    • addedOutput schema / properties / data / items / properties / tenant
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "External id of the tenant, on an entry of a tenant's own suppression list",
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
  2. First observed

TDQS

C2.9/5.0
Behavior2/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint, destructiveHint=false and openWorldHint=false, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds no behavioral context of its own — nothing about pagination behavior, how the tenant parameter changes the result set, or whether an empty list is possible.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single efficient sentence with zero waste and the core purpose front-loaded. It is under-specified rather than bloated, but from a pure conciseness standpoint it is clean.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With a full output schema and annotations covering safety, the remaining burden is modest. Still, the definition omits any routing guidance among the suppression siblings and says nothing about pagination defaults, leaving the agent to lean entirely on structured fields.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so all four parameters (email, limit, cursor, tenant) are documented in the schema itself, including the non-obvious tenant override semantics. The description adds no parameter meaning beyond that, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb ("List") and resource ("suppressed recipient addresses"), so an agent knows exactly what it returns. It does not, however, differentiate itself from siblings such as add_suppression or remove_suppression beyond the implicit verb distinction.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives, no mention of prerequisites or auth, and no exclusions. The agent must infer usage entirely from the name.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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