Skip to main content
Glama

Fencer Intel vulnerability feed

Check dependencies

check_stack

Check exact package versions for known vulnerabilities. Pass a lockfile's contents (package-lock.json, bun.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, Pipfile.lock, Cargo.lock, go.sum, Gemfile.lock, composer.lock, mix.lock, packages.lock.json, gradle.lockfile, .github/workflows/*.yml, action.yml, pubspec.lock, Package.resolved, renv.lock, Manifest.toml, cabal.project.freeze, *.opam.locked) with its filename, an SBOM (CycloneDX JSON, SPDX 2 JSON, Syft JSON, e.g. from syft <image> -o cyclonedx-json; up to 10 MB) in the same field, or a package list. An SBOM's language packages are checked like a lockfile's; its OS packages (deb, apk, rpm and Arch alpm purls) are matched against the distro advisories for their release and come back in "os" (findings with the fixed version per package; releases with no advisories on file are marked unchecked, never guessed, and Arch-based distros such as Manjaro as unchecked "derivative"; a finding or package with possible: true comes from Arch's tracker, which gives no introduced version, so the version may predate the bug: say "may be affected"; keep the license objects of share-alike distro data with it). A language finding with unreviewed: true was matched on the maintainers' own GitHub advisory, or on the packages a CVE record names when its CNA's scope covers them, which GitHub has not reviewed yet: say so. A finding with inferred: true was matched on a package inferred from the CVE's product name and repository (no advisory lists the package), by the CVE's own version range: say it probably applies; unchecked items with reason "inferred" are such packages whose CVE gives no versions to compare, and with reason "maintainer" packages a maintainers' advisory names with a range Intel can't compare for that version, and with reason "cve" packages a CVE record names whose versions don't decide that one: say they may be affected. A GitHub Actions workflow or action.yml works too: each uses: owner/repo@ref is checked, a floating tag (v4) as the newest release of its line; refs pinned to a commit SHA (without a "# v1.2.3" comment) or a branch come back in "unchecked" with the advisories on file. Also lists versions endoflife.date marks as out of support (eol). No matches means none were found, not that the packages are safe.

Tool call template

This tool declares no required parameters. Add optional parameters from the input schema as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {},
    "name": "check_stack"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
filenameNoLockfile name, e.g. "package-lock.json". Detected from content if omitted (SBOMs always are).
lockfileNoFull text of the lockfile or SBOM.
packagesNoAlternatively, packages at exact versions.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so unusually well: it explains what comes back in "os", what unchecked/inferred/possible/maintainer/cve reasons mean, how floating tags vs SHA-pinned refs behave, and it closes with the crucial caveat that no matches means none found, not that packages are safe.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The purpose is front-loaded, but the body is a single unbroken wall of clauses, including a 24-item parenthetical lockfile list and dense nested caveats, which makes it hard to scan. Most sentences carry real information, yet the lack of structure (no separate lines for inputs, outputs, caveats) costs readability.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

No output schema exists, so the description must explain return values, and it does: os findings with fixed versions, unchecked items with named reasons, eol entries, inferred/possible/unreviewed flags, and unchecked workflow refs. For a tool of this complexity that is enough for an agent to call and interpret results correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, and the description earns a bump by adding real meaning: filename is detected from content if omitted (always for SBOMs), the SBOM may be up to 10 MB and goes in the same field, and the package list is an alternative input path. It does not explain the ecosystem enum or the packages object shape, which the schema already covers.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The first sentence gives a specific verb and resource ("Check exact package versions for known vulnerabilities") and the rest enumerates exactly what inputs it consumes, so the tool's function is unmistakable. It never names or contrasts with the siblings (get_vulnerability, search, list_feed), so differentiation is left to inference and it falls short of a 5.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage context is conveyed through the accepted input types: pass a lockfile with its filename, an SBOM, a raw package list, or a workflow/action.yml. That tells an agent when the tool applies, but there are no explicit exclusions or 'use X instead when...' routing toward the sibling vulnerability tools.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Try in Browser

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.

Resources