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create_project_token

Mint a PROJECT-scoped management token (er_mcp_) for MCP and REST; it cannot authenticate relay traffic. Use it after create_project to configure a fresh project, or for any project you already own. Attenuated by design: the scopes must be a subset of THIS token's own grant (read is always included), expiry is mandatory (1–90 days, default 30, never "never"), and the minted token — being project-scoped — can never mint tokens itself. spend is human-granted only: no token, of any scope, can mint one carrying it — mint a spend-scoped key from the project's panel instead. Requires an ACCOUNT-scoped token and the config scope. Returns the plaintext exactly once; only its hash is stored.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
slugYesThe slug of a project you own.
labelYesHuman-readable token label (1–100 chars).
scopesNoScopes for the minted token — must be a subset of this token's own scopes. `read` is always granted. `spend` and the legacy `billing` scope are never mintable here — panel-only. Default: read + config.
expiresInDaysNoDays until the minted token expires. Default 30. API-minted tokens always expire.

TDQS

A5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description discloses numerous non-obvious behaviors beyond the minimal annotations: scopes must be a subset of this token's own grant, `read` is always included, expiry is mandatory (1–90 days, default 30, never 'never'), minted tokens can never mint tokens, `spend` is human-granted only, and the plaintext is returned exactly once with only its hash stored. Annotations only provide readOnly/destructive hints, so this adds substantial behavioral context.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is dense but every sentence adds critical operational detail: purpose, usage timing, scope attenuation rules, authentication requirements, and return behavior. It is front-loaded with the primary action and follows a logical flow without redundancy or fluff.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a token-minting tool with 4 parameters and no output schema, the description covers lifecycle usage, security constraints, authentication prerequisites, and return-value handling. It leaves no major ambiguity for the agent to invoke the tool correctly, including what the token can and cannot do.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Although the input schema already describes all 4 parameters (100% coverage), the description enriches their meaning: scopes must be a subset of the caller's grant, `read` is always granted, `spend` and legacy `billing` are never mintable via this tool, and expiry is mandatory with a default of 30 days. These constraints go well beyond the schema's field-level descriptions.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb ('Mint') and a clearly defined resource ('PROJECT-scoped management token'), immediately distinguishing it from sibling tools like create_api_key or create_credential. It also specifies the token prefix (`er_mcp_`), its intended use for MCP and REST, and a key functional exclusion (cannot authenticate relay traffic).

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly states when to use: 'Use it after create_project to configure a fresh project, or for any project you already own.' It also names an alternative path for spend-scoped keys ('mint a spend-scoped key from the project's panel instead') and spells out the required authentication context (ACCOUNT-scoped token and `config` scope).

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A3.6/5.0
Disambiguation3/5

Most tools target distinct resources and the descriptions are unusually explicit, but the billing cluster (change_plan/cancel_subscription and the many add-on actions) plus the preview/diff tools overlap and could cause mis-selection. config_diff, dry_run_endpoint, and preview_line_draft all read as 'preview what will change' at first glance despite different scopes.

Naming Consistency4/5

The overwhelming majority follow a clean snake_case verb_noun pattern: create_*, get_*, list_*, set_*, update_*, delete_*. It is only held back by a few naming outliers such as config_diff and default_endpoint_template, which break the verb-first convention.

Tool Count1/5

78 tools is an extreme mismatch for an MCP server surface, even accounting for the broad management/relay domain. Such a large surface will overwhelm model context and make tool selection materially harder; this would be better split into focused servers for configuration, data-plane operations, and billing.

Completeness4/5

The tool surface is very thorough: projects, lines, endpoints, credentials, keys, configs/drafts, DLQ, requests, metrics, audit, team, and billing are all represented. Only minor gaps exist, such as no direct single-line get/update and the intentional inability to widen the outbound allowlist or lift archive protection via API.

Resources