Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, but the description adds what the annotations cannot: the concrete consequence (directory becomes public, indexable, no login), the irreversibility of the old password, and the critical caveat that success cannot be verified — only that the host accepted the request. That is exactly the behavioral layer the schema and annotations do not carry.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core action and the public-exposure consequence, followed by the two explicit limits. It is long, but for a destructive and unverifiable operation nearly every sentence carries decision-relevant information; only minor tightening is possible.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

There is no output schema, and the description compensates fully by explaining what the tool can and cannot report back (accepted, never confirmed) and supplying a concrete verification procedure. Combined with the alternatives and downstream effects, nothing an agent needs to call and report this correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so both parameters (domain, directory syntax and constraints) are already fully documented in the schema. The description reinforces that the path must come from the customer and cannot be discovered, but this point is already present in the schema description for 'directory', so it adds little beyond the baseline.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Hebt den Passwortschutz EINES Verzeichnisses einer Domain auf') and explicitly positions itself as the inverse of create_protected_directory. An agent can tell it apart from the sibling that creates protection without opening either schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives the when (reversing directory protection), the when-not ('Liegen dort Dateien, die niemand sehen soll, ist das der falsche Weg'), and the alternative (create_protected_directory to re-protect). It even notes that re-protection does not restore the old password, which affects the decision to invoke it at all.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.