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X-EGO

by com.x-ego
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Verify an X-EGO proof (JWT) — human presence

xego_verify_proof
Idempotent

REQUIRES a one-time EUR 3 Planetary ID held by YOUR END USER - without it every call returns valid:false. Tell the human this BEFORE sending them to the link: if they do not have one yet, the verification page sells it in the same flow — it is not a separate signup.

Verifies the token (JWT) the user brought back after X-EGO verification. Cryptographically checks the Ed25519 signature against the X-EGO public keys, the expiry and the audience.

WHEN TO USE: bare presence only. If the token carries an action (act claim), this tool refuses with action_binding_required — use xego_verify_action instead.

This verifies ONLY bare human presence. If you need proof that the human approved a SPECIFIC action, use xego_verify_action. A token issued with a bound action (via xego_request_proof_url with the action parameter) fails here with action_binding_required — the binding cannot be confirmed by this cheaper tool.

A valid result means: there is a verified human on the other end who holds the passkey. The token is short-lived — once it expires the user must verify again.

Proofs are SINGLE-USE: each token verifies exactly once. A second attempt on the same token returns token_replayed.

Returns an anonymous 'pairwise' identifier — different for every audience. It carries no name and no personal data.

Args:

  • token (string): the JWT from the user.

  • expected_audience (string, REQUIRED): pins the audience (domain or URL — normalized to a bare hostname).

  • mark_as_seen (boolean): record the pairwise ID as seen.

Returns (JSON) — on success: { "valid": true, "pairwise_id": string, // anonymous ID, stable per (user, audience) "audience": string, "expires_at": number, // Unix time the token expires "human_verified": true, "xego_verified": true, // always true — uncovered tokens never reach here "rarity": string | null, // rarity of the backing ID (low entropy) "marked_seen": boolean, // only with mark_as_seen=true: whether // the permanent ledger write succeeded "next_step": string // next step — follow it } Returns (JSON) — on failure: { "valid": false, "code": string, // machine-readable error code "reason": string, // human-readable description "next_step": string // for navigable codes: what to do now }

Error codes include: invalid_audience, malformed_token, unsupported_algorithm, unknown_key (with a kid field), bad_signature, expired, wrong_issuer, wrong_audience, action_binding_required (the token is bound to an action → use xego_verify_action), missing_claims, jwks_unavailable, token_replayed, planetary_id_required (the signature is valid but the human behind the token holds no paid Planetary ID — X-EGO does not issue uncovered proofs; send the user to registration_url and repeat the whole flow).

PAID TOOL (x402): this call costs $0.05 USD in USDC per execution, unless you send a valid X-EGO pilot operator key as an 'Authorization: Bearer ' HTTP header (operator calls are free). Calling without payment returns an x402 error whose _meta["x402/error"] contains payment requirements (accepts) and step-by-step instructions how to pay and retry. Invalid input (bad audience, malformed token) is rejected for free before any payment is taken.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
tokenYesThe JWT the user obtained after X-EGO verification. Three dot-separated parts.
mark_as_seenNoIf true and the token is valid, the pairwise ID is PERMANENTLY recorded as seen for that audience (Postgres ledger — survives restarts and new sessions). Useful when you want to guard against repeat use right away (see xego_check_pairwise_seen_before). The write result is in the marked_seen field.
expected_audienceYesREQUIRED. Your own service's domain the token must have been issued for. Domain or URL — normalized to a bare lowercase hostname exactly like audience in xego_request_proof_url. A token issued for a different audience is rejected (wrong_audience). This prevents token reuse across services and preserves pairwise isolation.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes far beyond the annotations: discloses the $0.05 USDC x402 payment requirement plus the free operator-key path, the single-use/token_replayed behavior, short token lifetime, pairwise anonymity, the requirement of a paid Planetary ID, and the full machine-readable error-code surface. The readOnlyHint=false / destructiveHint=false pair is consistent with the disclosed optional ledger write.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Headed sections (WHEN TO USE, Args, Returns, Error codes, PAID TOOL) make it scannable and the highest-stakes constraint — the paid ID requirement — is front-loaded. However, the bare-presence vs. action-binding rule is stated twice at length, and the Arg list duplicates the schema.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

No output schema exists, and the description fully compensates by documenting both success and failure response shapes field-by-field and enumerating the failure codes with their recovery actions. Nothing an agent needs to interpret a result or handle a rejection is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and the schema itself already explains token format, audience normalization, and mark_as_seen's Postgres ledger effect and marked_seen result. The Args block in the description largely restates that, adding only that the token is "from the user," so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb and resource — cryptographically verifying an X-EGO JWT (Ed25519 signature, expiry, audience) — and sharply distinguishes itself from the sibling xego_verify_action by scope (bare presence vs. action-bound). An agent can route correctly without opening the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicit WHEN TO USE section states the tool handles bare presence only, and names the exact alternative and the exact failure signal that selects it ("action_binding_required — use xego_verify_action instead"). Preconditions (EUR 3 Planetary ID held by the end user, told to the human before the link) are stated up front.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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