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token-vault-ladder

Token and Vault Exit Ladder — One decision on holding a Base token and a vault position: token-trap-detector (live bytecode, proxy slots, honeypot simulation) and vault-exit-lawyer (redeem limits, queue, admin powers, eth_call simulation) run in parallel; contract-auditor then audits the token's verified source at the proxy implementation the trap step read, and is skipped on a honeypot or unverified source. Returns the worst

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "tokenAddress": "<tokenAddress>",
      "chain": "<chain>",
      "vault": "<vault>",
      "exit": "<exit>"
    },
    "name": "token-vault-ladder"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
exitYesExactly one of shares or assets, as base-unit integer strings. shares may be "max" (needs holder).
chainYesChain the vault lives on.
vaultYesERC-4626 or ERC-7540 vault address.
holderNoAddress that holds the shares. Enables an exact eth_call redeem simulation and per-holder limits.
docsUrlsNoPublic documentation pages whose redemption claims are checked against the contract.
tokenAddressYesToken contract address on Base.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

B3.2/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden, and it does disclose genuinely useful internals: parallel execution, the exact signals each sub-step inspects (live bytecode, proxy slots, honeypot simulation; redeem limits, queue, admin powers, eth_call simulation), and a skip condition for the audit step. What it omits is the operationally important part — cost/latency of a multi-simulation pipeline, whether anything is mutated (read-only is only inferable from 'simulation'), failure behavior when one branch errors, and the return contract, which is truncated at 'Returns the worst '.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

It is compact, but it is one dense semicolon-chained run-on that packs the entire pipeline into a single breath, and it terminates mid-sentence ('Returns the worst '), which is a structural defect rather than brevity. The leading restatement of the tool label ('Token and Vault Exit Ladder —') does little work. Little is wasted, but readability and the broken tail cost it.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

This is a high-complexity tool — 6 parameters, a nested exit object, three chained sub-analyses, and no output schema — so the description must explain what comes back. Instead the return contract is truncated after 'Returns the worst ', leaving an agent unable to know the response shape or what 'worst' aggregates over. For an expensive orchestrated call with no annotations and no output schema, the missing return semantics and absent cost/failure disclosure are significant gaps.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already explains holder, shares/assets, docsUrls and chain; baseline 3 applies. The description adds only marginal semantics — that the token is on Base while the vault's chain is separately specified, and that the trap step's proxy implementation feeds the audit step. It adds no guidance on the exit object's exactly-one-of shares/assets rule or what 'max' requires beyond what the schema states.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description identifies a concrete composite job: a single decision on holding a Base token plus a vault position, executed by running token-trap-detector and vault-exit-lawyer in parallel and conditionally invoking contract-auditor. That is far more specific than the name alone and it implicitly distinguishes itself from its three component siblings. It loses a point because the framing sentence ('One decision on holding...') never states the deliverable cleanly, and the final clause is cut off mid-thought.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is only implied: by describing the three sub-tools as an orchestrated pipeline, an agent can infer this is the bundled alternative to calling token-trap-detector and vault-exit-lawyer separately. There is one explicit conditional rule (contract-auditor is skipped on a honeypot or unverified source), which is real guidance. But there is no explicit when-to-use vs token-due-diligence or screen-tokens, and no statement of when a caller should prefer the individual components instead.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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