wa_delete_webhookStop delivering inbound messages to the configured endpoint. Messages keep arriving and stay readable through wa_list_messages; only the push stops.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| note | No | ||
| deleted | Yes | ||
| refusal | No |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Output schema / properties / refusal / properties / account_statusAdded value: +{
+ "description": "when the number is not working: its status — starting, not_running, whatsapp_down, suspended, pairing, unlinked or locked",
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / properties / refusal / properties / account_status_reasonAdded value: +{
+ "description": "the detail of account_status, e.g. no_egress, stopped, no_plan",
+ "type": "string"
+}Output schema / properties / refusal / properties / sinceAdded value: +{
+ "description": "when the number stopped working, RFC3339, when known",
+ "type": "string"
+}Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and readOnlyHint=false, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds genuinely useful behavioral context beyond that: it clarifies exactly what is destroyed (the delivery push) versus what is preserved (inbound messages remain readable). Reversibility and auth requirements are still unstated.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two tight sentences, zero filler. The primary effect is front-loaded and the clarifying consequence follows immediately.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Output schema exists, so return values need no explanation, and annotations carry the safety profile. For a zero-param destructive toggle, the description supplies everything an agent needs: what it stops and what remains intact.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The tool takes zero parameters, so there is nothing for the description to disambiguate. Baseline 4 applies for a zero-param schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific action ("Stop delivering inbound messages to the configured endpoint") with a clear resource. It is unambiguous about what gets disabled. It never names the sibling tools it relates to (wa_enable_webhook, wa_set_webhook, wa_get_webhook), so differentiation is left to inference.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description establishes the effect and distinguishes it from hard deletion ("Messages keep arriving and stay readable through wa_list_messages; only the push stops"), which implicitly tells the agent when this is safe to call. However, it gives no explicit when-to-use guidance against the sibling webhook tools or any stated prerequisites.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.