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WhatsMCP: MCP for WhatsApp

Delete Group

wa_delete_group
Destructive

Delete a WhatsApp group: remove every other member and then leave. The account must be a group admin. WhatsApp has no true group-delete, so this empties the group and exits it.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
group_jidYesthe group (…@g.us) JID to delete, as returned by wa_list_groups
account_idYesthe account, as returned by wa_list_accounts

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
itemsNothe rows of a list operation
statusYesok (the operation succeeded) or refused (see refusal; for wa_update_group, applied lists the changes that took effect before it)
appliedNowa_update_group only: the settings that were changed, in order — on a refusal, the ones that took effect before it
refusalNopresent only when status is refused
summaryNoa human-readable result
group_jidNothe new group's JID (wa_create_group only) — use it as wa_send_message's 'to'
invite_linkNothe group's invite link (wa_create_group or wa_get_group_invite_link)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • addedOutput schema / properties / refusal / properties / candidates
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "on an account_ambiguous refusal: the accounts to choose from — retry with one of these as account_id",
      +  "items": {
      +    "additionalProperties": false,
      +    "properties": {
      +      "account_id": {
      +        "description": "the id to retry with as account_id",
      +        "type": "string"
      +      },
      +      "name": {
      +        "description": "the account's WhatsApp display name",
      +        "type": "string"
      +      },
      +      "phone": {
      +        "description": "the account's phone number, E.164",
      +        "type": "string"
      +      },
      +      "status": {
      +        "description": "whether the number works right now — live, connecting, or why not, as wa_list_accounts reports it",
      +        "type": "string"
      +      }
      +    },
      +    "required": [
      +      "account_id"
      +    ],
      +    "type": "object"
      +  },
      +  "type": [
      +    "null",
      +    "array"
      +  ]
      +}
  2. Changed3 schema fields changed
    • addedOutput schema / properties / refusal / properties / account_status
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "when the number is not working: its status — starting, not_running, whatsapp_down, suspended, pairing, unlinked or locked",
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
    • addedOutput schema / properties / refusal / properties / account_status_reason
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "the detail of account_status, e.g. no_egress, stopped, no_plan",
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
    • addedOutput schema / properties / refusal / properties / since
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "when the number stopped working, RFC3339, when known",
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
  3. Changed2 schema fields changed
    • addedOutput schema / properties / applied
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "wa_update_group only: the settings that were changed, in order — on a refusal, the ones that took effect before it",
      +  "items": {
      +    "type": "string"
      +  },
      +  "type": [
      +    "null",
      +    "array"
      +  ]
      +}
    • changedOutput schema / properties / status / description
      Previous value: -"ok (the operation succeeded) or refused (nothing was done)"New value: +"ok (the operation succeeded) or refused (see refusal; for wa_update_group, applied lists the changes that took effect before it)"
  4. First observed

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=false; the description adds the critical non-obvious behavior that WhatsApp has no true group-delete and the group is emptied and exited instead. That is exactly the kind of consequence an agent needs before invoking a destructive operation, plus the auth prerequisite.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three short sentences, action first, then precondition, then the caveat that explains the mechanism. No filler and nothing that could be cut without losing information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a two-parameter destructive mutation with full annotation coverage, a complete schema and an output schema, the description covers purpose, authorization requirement, and the surprising side effect. Nothing an agent needs in order to decide or call is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and both parameters (group_jid, account_id) document where their values come from, so the schema does the heavy lifting. The description only implies that group_jid identifies the target and adds no format or edge-case detail beyond that, so baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Delete a WhatsApp group') and immediately explains the mechanism — remove every other member then leave — which is exactly what separates it from wa_leave_chat and wa_remove_participants. An agent can distinguish the three without opening any schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives a hard prerequisite ('The account must be a group admin'), which is real usage guidance for selecting and calling it correctly. It stops short of explicitly naming alternatives such as wa_leave_chat for a non-admin exit, so the when-not case is left to inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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