Skip to main content
Glama

Proof Inbox

wever_proof-inbox
Destructive

Paid URL: 0.10 USDC per call on Base; 10 signed-wallet free calls shared over rolling 30 days. Read the backend 402 body for x402 terms. Store, list and retrieve durable verification proofs in a private authenticated wallet inbox. Operating boundary: Store, list and retrieve durable verification proofs in a private authenticated wallet inbox. Agents store and retrieve proofs by reference; humans inspect those records through their wallet-connected agent. Each proof keeps its verification status. Sign wallet ownership proof for each request. POST /api/proof-inbox. Existing product credentials, signed mandates, and single-use action grants remain required where applicable. This adapter grants no authority and never supplies server credentials. Wallet-authenticated durable trust service. Signed records attest only to the stated evidence and permission scope. See /api/trust-contract for the public verification key and bounded contract.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
modeYes
limitNo
proofNo
offsetNo
proof_idNo
idempotency_keyNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

B3.2/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare non-read-only, destructive, open-world, and non-idempotent behavior. The description adds concrete operational context beyond them: pricing on Base, free signed-wallet calls, reading the 402 body for x402 terms, required wallet proof per request, no authority granted, no server credentials, and the trust-contract endpoint.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness2/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The purpose is not front-loaded; the first sentence is pricing, and the 'Operating boundary' sentence repeats the inbox phrasing almost verbatim. Useful auth and payment facts are present, but repetition and poor ordering make the description bloated.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a six-parameter, three-mode, nested-object tool with no output schema, the description covers payment and authentication but omits what each mode returns, how proof_id is generated, pagination behavior, and parameter-level meaning. It is partially complete but leaves key invocation details to the schema structure.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must carry parameter meaning. It mentions no parameters at all—not the mode enum, nested proof fields (kind/label/content), idempotency_key format, offset/limit bounds, or proof_id pattern—leaving the structured schema as the only source of field semantics.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states specific verbs and a resource: 'Store, list and retrieve durable verification proofs in a private authenticated wallet inbox,' and names the three modes. However, it does not explicitly differentiate this tool from siblings such as wever_proof-relay or wever_receipt-passport, leaving scope comparison to inference.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is implied for agents storing/retrieving proofs and for humans inspecting records through a wallet-connected agent. It notes authentication prerequisites ('Sign wallet ownership proof for each request'), but gives no explicit when-not-to-use guidance or comparison with sibling proof tools.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Try in Browser

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.

Resources