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Update organization security settings

update_org_security
DestructiveIdempotent

Change security settings of an organization. require_mfa makes every member pass two-step verification before they can open organization flows (the caller must have two-step verification on). allow_public_publish false blocks public links. transcript_retention_days deletes transcripts of organization flows after that many days (null turns it off). allow_external_collaborators false lets members share organization flows only with other members. allowed_domains limits invitations and sharing to those email domains (it must include your own domain; an empty list allows all). Only an owner or an admin can do this.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
org_idYesOrganization id from list_organizations.
require_mfaNoRequire two-step verification for all members.
allowed_domainsNoEmail domains allowed for invitations and sharing, for example ["acme.com"]. Include your own domain. [] allows all domains. Up to 20.
scim_transfer_toNoEmail of a member who gets the flows of a member that SCIM removes. null means the first owner.
scim_default_roleNoRole for members that SCIM adds. Only an owner can pick admin.
allow_public_publishNoAllow public web links for organization flows.
transcript_retention_daysNo1 to 3650 days, or null to keep transcripts.
allow_external_collaboratorsNoAllow sharing organization flows with people who are not members. Existing outside collaborators stay until remove_external_collaborators.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already flag destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=true, so the bar is lower, but the description still adds substance: transcript_retention_days deletes transcripts, allow_external_collaborators=false demotes outside sharing to members-only, and there is an authorization requirement. It does not state whether this is a partial update (unspecified settings preserved) or whether changes are reversible, which is the main remaining gap for a destructive mutator.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loads the purpose, then spends one parenthetical clause per parameter with zero filler; the destructive/permission facts are placed where they matter. Slightly dense as a single paragraph, but nothing is redundant.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For an 8-parameter destructive mutation with no output schema, the description plus annotations cover the important ground: who can call it, what each major flag changes, and what gets deleted. It stops short of describing partial-update semantics and the SCIM fields, which an agent handling org provisioning would want.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so baseline is 3; the description earns above that by adding meaning not in the schema, notably that enabling require_mfa requires the caller's own MFA and that allowed_domains must include the caller's own domain. It leaves scim_transfer_to, scim_default_role and org_id entirely to the schema, so three of eight parameters get no descriptive treatment.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Opens with a specific verb+resource ("Change security settings of an organization") that is unambiguously distinct from the read-side get_org_security and from the general update_organization. It never names those siblings explicitly, so the differentiation is inferred rather than stated.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives a real usage gate: "Only an owner or an admin can do this," plus a nested precondition that the caller must themselves have two-step verification on before enabling require_mfa. There is no explicit when-to-use-this-vs-get_org_security/update_organization guidance or statement about what happens to omitted fields.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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