Remove a watchdog.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| name | Yes | ||
| vigil_key | No | Legacy credential argument. Prefer the HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates the request. |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. The verb 'Remove' implies destructive intent, but the description does not disclose whether deletion is permanent, whether it can fail, what happens to associated data, or what permissions are required.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is extremely short and front-loaded with the main action, which is structurally clean. However, it is under-specified: a single six-word sentence does not provide enough useful context for a destructive operation.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a deletion tool with no annotations, no output schema, and an undocumented required parameter, this description is incomplete. An agent would not know what happens after removal, whether the operation is reversible, or how the name parameter should be supplied.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is only 50%, with the required parameter 'name' having no description in either the schema or the tool description. The description does not clarify that 'name' identifies which watchdog to remove, nor does it address the vigil_key parameter's role or alternatives.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb ('Remove') and a clear resource ('a watchdog'), and the action is distinct from sibling tools like vigil_set_watchdog and vigil_watchdog_status. However, it does not define what a watchdog is or explicitly contrast itself with related tools, leaving slight ambiguity.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides no guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives such as vigil_set_watchdog or vigil_watchdog_status. No prerequisites, consequences, or exclusion conditions are mentioned.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
The tools are organized into clear domains—receipts/notarization, leases, journals, watchdogs, and account management—and each tool has a distinct resource or action. Minor confusion is possible between vigil_anchor and vigil_anchors, or between the various verification tools, but the descriptions generally make the boundaries clear.
All tools share the vigil_ prefix and use snake_case, but the verb/noun ordering is inconsistent: vigil_get_receipt and vigil_delete_watchdog use verb-first, while vigil_journal_get and vigil_journal_delete use resource-first. Several tools are also pure nouns (vigil_chain, vigil_usage, vigil_lease_status), making the overall pattern mixed but still readable.
At 26 tools, this exceeds the 25+ threshold and feels heavy for a single MCP server, even though the tools cluster into several subsystems. Some status, info, and lease-listing tools could plausibly be consolidated without losing much capability.
The core lifecycle coverage is strong: receipts can be created, read, verified, and audited via the chain; leases have grant/renew/revoke/status/verify; journals have full CRUD; watchdogs have set/delete/status/heartbeat. Minor gaps exist, such as no direct way to update a watchdog without deleting and recreating it, but these are workable.