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UAI x402 Security Tools

security-alert-triage

Triage security alert emails for urgency, severity, likely cause, and evidence collection steps without storing message bodies. (REST equivalent: POST /api/v1/security-alert-triage, $0.10)

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "subject": "<subject>",
      "from": "<from>",
      "body": "<body>"
    },
    "name": "security-alert-triage"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
bodyYesAlert email body
fromYesAlert sender address
sourceNoOptional source label (aws, gcp, etc.)
subjectYesAlert email subject

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.7/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations carry only a title, so the description bears the full burden and it does add real behavioral context: message bodies are not stored (a privacy/data-handling guarantee), the operation maps to POST /api/v1/security-alert-triage, and it costs $0.10. It stops short of stating auth requirements, whether messages are otherwise logged, or whether the call is idempotent, but the privacy and cost disclosures are substantive rather than restated structured data.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two short sentences with the core purpose front-loaded and the privacy constraint immediately after. The parenthetical REST endpoint and price are secondary but genuinely useful; nothing is padding, though the pricing detail is somewhat orthogonal to the definition of the action.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description usefully enumerates the return fields (urgency, severity, likely cause, evidence steps), so an agent knows what a triage result contains. Combined with a fully documented 4-parameter schema, the definition is nearly complete, missing only auth/retention details for a tool that handles sensitive email content.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so all four parameters (subject, from, body, optional source) are already documented in the schema. The description adds no format, size, or usage detail for those fields beyond noting that bodies are not stored; baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (triage) and resource (security alert emails) plus the four outputs it produces: urgency, severity, likely cause, and evidence collection steps. It does not explicitly route against similarly security-themed siblings (cve-lookup, secret-scan, email-vendor-risk-summary), but the input shape ('email subject/from/body') makes the scope distinguishable.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is implied by 'triage security alert emails' – an agent can infer this applies to forwarded alert messages rather than raw logs or repositories. However there is no explicit when-to-use/when-not guidance, no prerequisites, and no named alternative for related security tasks.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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