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Save payment app keys

update_app_credentials
DestructiveIdempotent

Save the API keys of a payment app the user installed (PayPal, Alby, BTCPay Server, HitPay). Ask the user to type the keys themselves; never reuse other secrets.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "credentialId": "<credentialId>",
      "key": "<key>"
    },
    "name": "update_app_credentials"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
keyYesThe app's key fields, e.g. { client_id, secret_key } for PayPal.
credentialIdYesThe app's credential id, from list_connections.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A3.5/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, idempotentHint=true and openWorldHint=true, and the description adds a genuine security constraint about never reusing secrets. However, it does not say what the destructive behavior means in practice — whether existing keys are overwritten, whether prior credentials are invalidated, or what permissions are required.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two short sentences, front-loaded with the action and scope, followed by the one non-obvious behavioral constraint. No filler or redundancy.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, open-world mutation with a free-form nested object parameter and no output schema, the description covers the security rule but leaves the overwrite semantics and any result/confirmation behavior unexplained. It is adequate but not complete for a write tool of this risk profile.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the schema itself documents both fields, including the example shape of the nested key object and the note that credentialId comes from list_connections. The description adds no parameter-level meaning beyond that, so the baseline of 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description uses a specific verb+resource ("Save the API keys of a payment app") and enumerates supported providers (PayPal, Alby, BTCPay Server, HitPay), so an agent can tell this apart from read-side siblings like list_api_keys or get_app. It stops short of explicitly naming an alternative tool, which keeps it from a 5.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives a procedural rule ("Ask the user to type the keys themselves; never reuse other secrets") but never states when to use this versus other credential/connection tools, nor any prerequisite such as first obtaining the credentialId via list_connections. Usage is implied rather than scoped.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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