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Open a sealed record

pull_open

Opens a sealed record (the public half, or {"sealed": ...}) with its secret (key, iv, nonce): the content, and whether the seal is intact. A seal that does not open is a finding, not a refused input: it answers 200 with ok false, intact false and why. Nothing is kept. Costs 1 unit, a broken seal included.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
sealedYesThe sealed record (its public half), as JSON.
secretYesThe secret half (key, iv, nonce) that opens it, as JSON.

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
msNoMilliseconds the run took.
jobYesThe job id; the job tool reads it.
verbNoThe tool that made it.
filesNoFiles made, each with a name, type, size and a signed URL.
unitsNoUnits this call cost.
resultNoThe engine's own answer, a JSON document.
statusNoqueued when the job runs in the background.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed6 schema fields changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / sealed / description
      Added value: +"The sealed record (its public half), as JSON."
    • removedInput schema / properties / secret / $ref
      Removed value: -"#/properties/sealed"
    • addedInput schema / properties / secret / additionalProperties
      Added value: +{
      +  "$ref": "#/properties/sealed/additionalProperties"
      +}
    • addedInput schema / properties / secret / description
      Added value: +"The secret half (key, iv, nonce) that opens it, as JSON."
    • addedInput schema / properties / secret / type
      Added value: +"object"
    • changedOutput schema / (root)
      Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
      +  "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
      +  "additionalProperties": true,
      +  "properties": {
      +    "files": {
      +      "description": "Files made, each with a name, type, size and a signed URL.",
      +      "items": {
      +        "additionalProperties": {},
      +        "type": "object"
      +      },
      +      "type": "array"
      +    },
      +    "job": {
      +      "description": "The job id; the job tool reads it.",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "ms": {
      +      "description": "Milliseconds the run took.",
      +      "type": "number"
      +    },
      +    "result": {
      +      "description": "The engine's own answer, a JSON document."
      +    },
      +    "status": {
      +      "description": "queued when the job runs in the background.",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "units": {
      +      "description": "Units this call cost.",
      +      "type": "number"
      +    },
      +    "verb": {
      +      "description": "The tool that made it.",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    }
      +  },
      +  "required": [
      +    "job"
      +  ],
      +  "type": "object"
      +}
  2. First observed

TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the annotations, the description discloses substantial behavior: the failure path returns 200 with ok false, intact false and a reason (rather than erroring), nothing is persisted ('Nothing is kept'), and the call costs 1 unit even for a broken seal. Cost and statelessness are exactly the kind of context annotations do not convey. The one soft tension is 'Nothing is kept' against readOnlyHint=false, but the 'Costs 1 unit' billing mutation reconciles it.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The action is front-loaded and the three sentences are information-dense with little waste. The first sentence is heavy with nested parentheticals and a JSON fragment, which slightly hurts readability, but nothing is redundant.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With an output schema present, return values need no explanation, and annotations cover the safety profile; the description still goes further by documenting the failure response, cost, and statelessness. The only omission is any reference to the pull_seal/pull_close relationship, which would help an agent place it among siblings.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, and the schema already states 'The sealed record (its public half)' and 'The secret half (key, iv, nonce)'. The description largely restates this, adding only the loose `{"sealed": ...}` wrapper hint, so it sits at the baseline where the schema does the heavy lifting.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb (opens) and resource (a sealed record) and even clarifies the two inputs (public half plus secret) and the two things returned (content and seal integrity). It is unmistakably a decrypt/verify operation. It stops short of naming the inverse sibling pull_seal, so there is no explicit sibling differentiation.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is implied rather than stated: the agent learns this is the tool for a sealed record you hold the secret for, and the note that a non-opening seal is 'a finding, not a refused input' sets expectations for the call. However, no alternative (e.g. pull_seal, the inverse) is named and there is no explicit when-not guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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