Tokenrip

Set artifact visibility

artifact_share_policy

Destructive

Set who beyond its home can read an artifact: private, link (anyone with the URL) or public (standalone only: listed). A workspace artifact takes private or link, set by its editors, and needs no why; returns the URL.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "artifactId": "<artifactId>",
      "visibility": "<visibility>"
    },
    "name": "artifact_share_policy"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description
`why`	No	Required for workspace items: one sentence on what the person is trying to accomplish, in their terms, not a description of this edit. Every workspace write takes one; sessions and summaries record themselves from it. Not needed to change only visibility; recorded when sent. At most 300 characters.
`artifactId`	Yes	The artifact: its id, its alias (bare, ~agent/alias or _team/alias), or its page URL.
`visibility`	Yes	Standalone: private (you and the teams it is shared with), link or public. Workspace: private or link.
`expectedWorkspaceRevision`	No	Optional: refuse (CONFLICT) if the artifact changed since this workspaceRevision.

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`artifact`	Yes
`shareUrl`	Yes
`visibility`	Yes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed1 schema field changedNov 12, 2026
- removedOutput schema / properties / artifact / properties / audience
```
Removed value: -{
-  "enum": [
-    "internal",
-    "shared"
-  ],
-  "type": "string"
-}
```

Changed5 schema fields changedOct 27, 2026

addedOutput schema / properties / artifact / properties / alias

Added value: +{
+  "anyOf": [
+    {
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "null"
+    }
+  ]
+}

addedOutput schema / properties / artifact / properties / folder

Added value: +{
+  "anyOf": [
+    {
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "properties": {
+        "id": {
+          "format": "uuid",
+          "pattern": "^([0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[1-8][0-9a-fA-F]{3}-[89abAB][0-9a-fA-F]{3}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}|00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000|ffffffff-ffff-ffff-ffff-ffffffffffff)$",
+          "type": "string"
+        },
+        "slug": {
+          "type": "string"
+        },
+        "teamSlug": {
+          "type": "string"
+        }
+      },
+      "required": [
+        "id",
+        "slug"
+      ],
+      "type": "object"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "null"
+    }
+  ]
+}

addedOutput schema / properties / artifact / properties / rawUrl

Added value: +{
+  "anyOf": [
+    {
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "null"
+    }
+  ]
+}

addedOutput schema / properties / artifact / properties / title

Added value: +{
+  "anyOf": [
+    {
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "null"
+    }
+  ]
+}

changedOutput schema / properties / artifact / required

Previous value: -[
-  "id",
-  "url",
-  "type",
-  "currentVersionId"
-]New value: +[
+  "id",
+  "url",
+  "rawUrl",
+  "type",
+  "currentVersionId",
+  "alias",
+  "title",
+  "folder"
+]

First observedOct 23, 2026

TDQS

A4/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, idempotentHint=false and openWorldHint=true, so the safety profile is partly covered. The description still adds substantive semantics the annotations cannot: what each visibility level exposes ("anyone with the URL," "listed") and that the call returns the URL. It never explicitly warns that widening visibility is an exposure that may be hard to undo, which is the main behavioral risk of a destructive, non-idempotent write.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two tight sentences with the action and the three modes front-loaded, then the workspace constraint and the return value. Every clause carries information, and nothing is repeated for padding despite the dense phrasing.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With an output schema present, return values need not be explained, yet the description still notes the URL is returned. For a destructive mutation tool it covers the modes, the workspace restriction, who may invoke it, and the why requirement, leaving only the exposure/irreversibility caveat unaddressed.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so all four parameters, including why, artifactId, visibility and expectedWorkspaceRevision, are already documented in the schema, which sets the baseline at 3. The description adds only marginal meaning on top, glossing "link" as "anyone with the URL" and "public" as "listed," while largely restating the enum description.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description gives a specific verb and resource ("Set who beyond its home can read an artifact") and enumerates the three visibility states with their meanings, so an agent knows exactly what changes. It stops short of naming an adjacent sibling such as artifact_publish, which plausibly overlaps with the public/listed outcome, so the differentiation is implicit rather than stated.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It states the applicable conditions clearly: public is "standalone only: listed," a workspace artifact accepts only private or link, and the change is made by editors. That is real routing context for choosing a value. It does not explicitly exclude or redirect to an alternative tool when the goal is broader publication, so it is not a full when/when-not statement.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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