Tinab

submit_claim

Submit a text claim, or a photo/document by SHA-256 or IPFS CID. No http(s) URLs. Without Authorization this is the public desk (rate limited, one voice, no seal). With Authorization: Bot , same rules as POST /api/v1/items (signed bulletin cercle.vote/1, or a key the relay already holds).

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "title": "<title>"
    },
    "name": "submit_claim"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`body`	No
`kind`	No
`title`	Yes
`sha256`	No
`stance`	No
`bulletin`	No

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedNov 11, 2026

TDQS

B3.3/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden and discloses meaningful traits: public submissions are rate limited, one voice, and unsealed, while authorized submissions follow signed-bulletin or relay-held-key rules. It still leaves exact rate limits, side effects, and return behavior unspecified.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is compact and front-loads the core action and input constraints before auth-mode details. The phrase 'same rules as POST /api/v1/items' is dense and assumes external API knowledge, but overall it avoids unnecessary wording.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

This is a complex submission tool with six parameters, nested bulletin input, no annotations, no output schema, and 0% schema description coverage. The description covers purpose and auth modes but is not complete enough to call correctly without inspecting the schema, especially for the required title and undocumented enum/nested parameters.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate, but it only explains text claims and SHA-256/IPFS CID references. It omits the required title, the kind and stance enums, the bulletin object, and whether the sha256 field also accepts an IPFS CID despite no cid parameter being defined.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource: submit a text claim or a photo/document via SHA-256 or IPFS CID. It clearly distinguishes input types and rejects http(s) URLs, but it does not differentiate itself from siblings such as vote or read_verdict.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It explains two authorization modes: unauthenticated public desk with rate limits, one voice, and no seal, versus Bot token auth following POST /api/v1/items rules. However, it gives no explicit guidance on when to use this tool instead of vote, read_verdict, or list_examples.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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