Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

There are no annotations, so the description carries the full burden of disclosing behavior. It does not state whether the operation is read-only, performs network requests, has rate limits, or has side effects; the phrase 'exposure (per-target)' only restates the core purpose.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is a compact single phrase with no filler and leads with the resource type. It is appropriately sized for the tool's low parameter count, though it sacrifices explicit action for brevity.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Even with an output schema present and a single parameter, the description omits parameter definition, usage context, and behavior. For a security-scanning tool with no annotations, this is not enough for an agent to call it correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The schema has one undocumented parameter q at 0% description coverage, so the description must compensate. It hints that the tool is per-target but never names q or explains its expected format (e.g., URL, domain, IP), leaving agents to guess.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description identifies a specific resource class—exposed .git, .env, and backup files—and indicates per-target scope, so an agent can infer it checks a target for these exposures. However, it is a noun fragment without an explicit verb like 'scan' or 'detect', and it does not distinguish itself from related siblings such as dirlisting or gh_dorking.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

No guidance is given about when to use this tool instead of alternatives, nor any when-not-to-use conditions. 'Per-target' is the only contextual clue, which is not enough to route selection among the many sibling security/scanning tools.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.