Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so well: it declares the operation mutating, states that MCP invocation is refused, and points to the authenticated alternative. No relevant behavioral trait is hidden.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The definition is a single front-loaded sentence that covers action, mutation status, refusal condition, and fallback. Every clause earns its place with no wasted words.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given zero parameters, no output schema, and no annotations, the description is complete: it explains that the tool is unusable over MCP and directs the agent to the correct authenticated endpoint. Nothing needed for correct selection behavior is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

There are zero parameters, so the baseline is 4. The description does not need to explain input semantics, and the alternative endpoint's path/parameter needs are noted only incidentally.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb+resource ('Re-pin a suspended bond') and immediately discloses its operational status ('refused over MCP'). This clearly distinguishes it from siblings like post_bond or bonded_status_query, and an agent can tell exactly what the tool would do and why it cannot be invoked.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It explicitly says the tool is refused over MCP and names the alternative HTTP endpoint with required bearer-token auth. There is no ambiguity about when to use this tool versus the alternative: never invoke it via MCP; call POST /bonds/<id>/repin instead.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.