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update_secret_key

update_secret_key
DestructiveIdempotent

Activate/deactivate a test app secret key or select it for webhooks. Supply active and/or usedForWebhooks as booleans. Select an active replacement before unselecting or deactivating the current webhook key. Returns metadata only.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "id": "<id>"
    },
    "name": "update_secret_key"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYesThe full 12-character ID returned by list_secret_keys.
activeNoWhether the key is valid for authentication.
usedForWebhooksNoSelect an active key for webhook signing, replacing the current selection.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already flag destructiveHint=true, idempotentHint=true, and readOnlyHint=false, so the safety profile is covered structurally; the description adds the sequencing constraint that prevents orphaning webhook signing and states that only metadata is returned. It still doesn't say what breaks when a key is deactivated (auth failures, webhook signature rejection), which is the key consequence for a destructive mutation.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three tight sentences, front-loaded with the action, then the parameter instructions, then the sequencing constraint and return note. No filler; the only minor friction is the dense packing of two distinct operations in one sentence.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 3-parameter mutation with full schema coverage, annotations carrying the safety profile, and no output schema, the description supplies the essential operational constraint and explicitly sets expectations on the return value. The remaining gap is consequences of deactivation, which an agent must currently infer from the destructive annotation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the schema already explains that usedForWebhooks selects an active key replacing the current one and that active controls authentication validity. The description's 'supply active and/or usedForWebhooks as booleans' and the ordering rule add only modest meaning beyond that baseline.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb set (activate/deactivate/select) on a specific resource (test app secret key) and scopes it further to webhook usage, which clearly separates it from create/get/delete siblings. It falls short of a 5 only because the distinction from delete_secret_key (deactivate vs. permanently remove) is left implicit.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives concrete operating guidance: supply active and/or usedForWebhooks as booleans, and select an active replacement before unselecting or deactivating the current webhook key. That is a real precondition an agent must follow. It does not say when to prefer this over delete_secret_key or how to recover from a mistaken deactivation.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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