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BCD — Bridge Control Delegate

stop_process

Destructive

Stop a start_process session with TERM (force: KILL). waitMs waits for it to exit and returns its final status.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYes
forceNo
waitMsNo
deviceIdNoComputer name or id from list_devices. Optional with one computer online or a default set.
workSessionIdNoWork session from create_work_session. Pass the same ID on every call in this conversation; omit for legacy unscoped work.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / workSessionId
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Work session from create_work_session. Pass the same ID on every call in this conversation; omit for legacy unscoped work.",
      +  "format": "uuid",
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
  2. First observed

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and readOnlyHint=false, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds genuine behavioral detail beyond that: default signal is TERM versus KILL when force is set, and waitMs blocks until exit and returns final status.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single dense sentence that front-loads the action and folds signal semantics and the waitMs behavior in without waste. Slightly telegraphic, but every clause earns its place.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive mutation tool with annotations covering the safety profile, the description covers the core behavior, signal escalation, and a hint at the return value. deviceId and workSessionId context lives in the schema, and no output schema is present, so nothing critical is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is only 40%, so the description should compensate. It explains force and the waitMs blocking/return semantics, but leaves the required 'id' unexplained in the description (its format is uuid per schema) and the behavior of force when already exited unaddressed.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb+resource (stop a process session) and explicitly ties it to the start_process sibling, so an agent can distinguish it from start_process and list_process_sessions. The '(force: KILL)' gloss pins down the escalation behavior.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description makes the usage context clear: it stops sessions created by start_process, not arbitrary processes. It stops short of stating when not to use it or naming an alternative (e.g., process_input to send signals), so it lacks explicit exclusions.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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