Skip to main content
Glama

Rotate webhook signing secret

rotate_webhook_endpoint_secret
Destructive

Replace a webhook endpoint's signing secret. Every attempt from now on, retries included, is signed with the new one, so the user's app must switch at once or it will reject events. Confirm with the user first.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "webhook_endpoint_id": "<webhook_endpoint_id>"
    },
    "name": "rotate_webhook_endpoint_secret"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
webhook_endpoint_idYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, idempotentHint=false, and readOnlyHint=false, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds real behavioral value beyond that: the rotation applies retroactively to retries, and the consumer must update immediately or lose events. It does not state whether the new secret is returned in the response or must be fetched separately, which matters for a destructive rotation.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three short sentences, front-loaded with the action, then the consequence, then the safety instruction. Every sentence earns its place with no restatement of the title or boilerplate.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a one-parameter destructive mutation with no output schema, the description covers the danger, the timing constraint, and the confirmation requirement. The remaining gap is the return behavior (whether the new secret comes back from this call) and any permission requirements, which an agent would want before invoking.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0% for the single parameter, so the description carries the full burden of explaining it — and it never mentions webhook_endpoint_id at all. The parameter name is fairly self-explanatory as a string identifier, which keeps this above a 1, but the description adds no meaning about which endpoint to target or what format the id takes.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb and resource: "Replace a webhook endpoint's signing secret." This is unmistakably different from the read-only sibling get_webhook_endpoint_secret and from update_webhook_endpoint, so an agent can route correctly without opening either schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives an explicit operational precondition — "Confirm with the user first" — plus the consequence that makes confirmation necessary (the app must switch at once or reject events). It stops short of naming alternatives such as get_webhook_endpoint_secret for retrieving the new value, so routing guidance is strong but not exhaustive.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Try in Browser

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.

Resources