search_js_obfuscationSearch JS obfuscation signals.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | No | ||
| has_eval | No | ||
| risk_level | No | ||
| min_risk_score | No |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The annotations already indicate read-only, idempotent, and non-destructive behavior, so the description carries a low burden for safety. However, it adds no extra behavioral context, such as pagination behavior, default limit, or the meaning of risk scores. It merely restates the tool's purpose without elaborating on results or side effects.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, front-loaded sentence with no filler, which is structurally concise. However, it is under-specified to the point of being less useful than a more detailed description would be. It is not a tautology, but it borders on too terse to be effective.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool has four input parameters, an output schema, and numerous sibling search tools, the description is far too terse to orient an agent. It does not describe what 'signals' refers to, how to filter results, or when this endpoint is preferred over related search tools. The output schema exists but the description still needs to provide search semantics.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema has zero parameter descriptions (0% coverage), so the description must compensate. It does not explain any of the four parameters (limit, has_eval, risk_level, min_risk_score). The phrase 'obfuscation signals' does not clarify acceptable values or semantics, leaving the agent to guess what inputs mean.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a clear verb ('Search') and resource ('JS obfuscation signals'), but 'signals' is vague and does not specify what constitutes a signal. It also does not distinguish this tool from sibling tools like search_js_fingerprint_obfuscated or search_js_malware_families, which could be easily confused.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides no guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives. It lacks any mention of use cases, prerequisites, or exclusions, leaving the agent to infer from the name alone. Unlike better-described siblings, there is no hint of what makes this search unique.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Many tools overlap in purpose, particularly the JS fingerprint search functions (e.g., search_js_fingerprint_by_md5 and search_jsfingerprints_by_md5) which are nearly identical. The large number of get_* and search_* tools for various statistics also creates boundary ambiguity.
The verb_noun pattern is mostly followed, but there are significant inconsistencies: 'jsfingerprints' vs 'js_fingerprints' vs 'js_fingerprint', and the occasional use of 'find' instead of 'search' (e.g., find_js_fingerprint_similar_by_hash). This mixed style makes it hard to predict tool names.
With 128 tools, the server is severely over-scoped. Many tools could be combined (e.g., all search_jsfingerprints_by_* variants) or parameterized. The sheer number overwhelms an agent and suggests poor API design.
The core URL scanning workflow (submit, retrieve results, search, analyze) is well covered, including detailed sub-analyses like malware, YARA, and JS fingerprints. Minor gaps include no scan cancellation or user-specific scan listing, but overall coverage is strong.