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Search JS Malware Families

search_js_malware_families
Read-onlyIdempotent

Search JS malware families.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
limitNo
min_cluster_sizeNo
similarity_thresholdNo

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

TDQS

D1.3/5.0
Behavior1/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, openWorldHint=true, idempotentHint=true, and destructiveHint=false, but the description adds no behavioral information beyond that — no mention of result format, pagination, clustering behavior, or limitations. Since there is no contradiction, this is a missed opportunity but not an annotation conflict.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness2/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The one-sentence description is overly terse and mostly repeats the title. While it is structurally clean, it has no substantive content, so this is under-specification rather than effective conciseness.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness1/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given a 3-parameter search tool with clustering-related parameters, an output schema, and many similar siblings, the description provides essentially no context. It fails to explain what malware families are, how the parameters relate, or what the response contains.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters1/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, and the description does not mention limit, min_cluster_size, or similarity_threshold. The schema only provides types/defaults, so the agent is left to guess what these parameters mean or how they affect results.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose2/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description is essentially identical to the tool name/title ('Search JS malware families.'), adding no specificity about what constitutes a family or how the search works. It does not distinguish this from sibling search tools like search_js_fingerprint_by_library or search_js_segments_by_hash.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines1/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

No guidance is given about when to use this tool versus the many sibling search tools, nor any exclusions or prerequisites. The description has no usage context whatsoever.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

C2.3/5.0
Disambiguation2/5

Many tools overlap in purpose, particularly the JS fingerprint search functions (e.g., search_js_fingerprint_by_md5 and search_jsfingerprints_by_md5) which are nearly identical. The large number of get_* and search_* tools for various statistics also creates boundary ambiguity.

Naming Consistency2/5

The verb_noun pattern is mostly followed, but there are significant inconsistencies: 'jsfingerprints' vs 'js_fingerprints' vs 'js_fingerprint', and the occasional use of 'find' instead of 'search' (e.g., find_js_fingerprint_similar_by_hash). This mixed style makes it hard to predict tool names.

Tool Count1/5

With 128 tools, the server is severely over-scoped. Many tools could be combined (e.g., all search_jsfingerprints_by_* variants) or parameterized. The sheer number overwhelms an agent and suggests poor API design.

Completeness4/5

The core URL scanning workflow (submit, retrieve results, search, analyze) is well covered, including detailed sub-analyses like malware, YARA, and JS fingerprints. Minor gaps include no scan cancellation or user-specific scan listing, but overall coverage is strong.