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Add or remove a group member

set_group_member
DestructiveIdempotent

Add a person to a group, or remove them with member: false. Ids come from get_guard. Guard decides what AI tools, including you, may do on the team's databases, so change it only when the user asked for this exact change, and say what will change first. Needs an admin, the write scope, and an admin's approval in SaturnSQL for this AI tool: without it the call fails with code GUARD_APPROVAL_REQUIRED. Then call request_guard_edit, show the user the approvalUrl, and repeat the call after they approve. An approval lasts 12 hours; call end_guard_edit when the user's changes are done. Every change is recorded in SaturnSQL with the user's name.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "groupId": "<groupId>",
      "userId": "<userId>",
      "member": "<member>"
    },
    "name": "set_group_member"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
memberYestrue adds, false removes.
userIdYes
groupIdYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already flag destructiveHint=true, idempotentHint=true and readOnlyHint=false, and the description is consistent with them while adding substantial detail the annotations cannot carry: the GUARD_APPROVAL_REQUIRED error code, the admin-approval gating in SaturnSQL, the 12-hour approval window, and that each change is audited under the user's name. It also explains the risk domain ('Guard decides what AI tools, including you, may do'), which is exactly the kind of consequence disclosure a destructive tool needs.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

It is front-loaded with the action and direction flag, then risk guidance, then the approval workflow — a sensible ordering for an agent that may bail out early. It is dense with necessary operational detail, though the approval paragraph chains several steps in one block and could be slightly tightened.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a gated, destructive mutation with no output schema, the definition covers permissions, the approval flow, the error code, and the session-cleanup tool, which is most of what an agent needs to call it correctly. The remaining gap is return behavior on success (what is echoed back, and what happens if the user is already a member), which goes unstated.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is only 33%, and while userId and groupId have no descriptions at all, the description partially compensates by saying 'Ids come from get_guard' and restating the member flag semantics ('remove them with member: false'). It still does not clarify the id format or what a groupId refers to relative to the userId, so it covers the origin of the values but not their shape.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The first sentence states a specific verb+resource and the parameter that flips direction: 'Add a person to a group, or remove them with member: false.' This is clearly distinct from adjacent siblings like save_group, delete_group, and set_ai_access, and the agent can tell which operation it is invoking before reading the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives an explicit precondition and restraint ('change it only when the user asked for this exact change, and say what will change first'), names the required capabilities (admin, write scope, approval), and prescribes the exact fallback sequence via request_guard_edit, showing approvalUrl, and repeating the call. It also states the approval's 12-hour lifetime and the end_guard_edit terminator, so the agent knows the full lifecycle, not just the single call.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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