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Delete group

delete_group
Destructive

Delete a group by its id from get_guard, with its access rules. Guard decides what AI tools, including you, may do on the team's databases, so change it only when the user asked for this exact change, and say what will change first. Needs an admin, the write scope, and an admin's approval in SaturnSQL for this AI tool: without it the call fails with code GUARD_APPROVAL_REQUIRED. Then call request_guard_edit, show the user the approvalUrl, and repeat the call after they approve. An approval lasts 12 hours; call end_guard_edit when the user's changes are done. Every change is recorded in SaturnSQL with the user's name.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "id": "<id>"
    },
    "name": "delete_group"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the destructiveHint annotation, the description discloses the cascade to access rules, the admin + write scope requirements, the exact failure code GUARD_APPROVAL_REQUIRED, the approval URL flow, the 12-hour approval lifetime, and audit logging with the user's name. That is unusually rich. It stops short of describing the response body or what happens to members/other references, which keeps it off a 5.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the action and scope, then the safety and approval constraints in execution order. It is dense with required operational detail, though the approval narrative runs long enough that the core 'what it does' is diluted slightly.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive mutation with no output schema, the definition covers prerequisites, the failure mode, the multi-step approval workflow, its expiry, and cleanup. An agent has everything needed to call it correctly and recover from the approval error.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The schema has a single undocumented 'id' parameter at 0% coverage, and the description compensates by specifying that the id comes from get_guard. The only remaining gap is the id's format/type, which the schema's string type already covers.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Delete a group by its id') and adds the important scope detail that its access rules go with it. It also anchors the resource to the sibling that produces the id (get_guard), so the agent knows where the group comes from.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives an explicit precondition for use ('change it only when the user asked for this exact change, and say what will change first') and names the follow-up tools request_guard_edit and end_guard_edit with the conditions that trigger each. Alternatives and sequencing are spelled out rather than inferred.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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