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Check a Remote Candidate for Fraud

check_identity_risk
Read-onlyIdempotent

Identity-verification protocol for remote engineering hires (fake candidates, stand-ins, North Korean IT worker schemes per FBI guidance) and a red-flag log for a specific candidate. Same checks for every finalist; never based on origin or accent.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
situationNoWhere you are in the process and what made you suspicious, if anything. Do not paste ID documents.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A3.5/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already establish readOnlyHint, idempotentHint, destructiveHint=false and openWorldHint=false, so safety and determinism are covered. The description adds that checks are applied uniformly and are origin/accent-neutral, which is useful policy context, but it says nothing about what the red-flag log contains or how the protocol proceeds.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two sentences, front-loaded with the core purpose before the fairness constraint. The long parenthetical listing threat schemes is slightly dense but each clause carries information; nothing is redundant.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a read-only, idempotent tool with one optional parameter and no output schema, the description covers purpose, scope and fairness policy adequately. An agent would still want to know roughly what the red-flag log returns, but the low-stakes read-only nature makes this a minor gap.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

There is a single optional parameter with 100% schema description coverage, so the schema already documents 'situation' fully, including the maxLength and the warning not to paste ID documents. The description adds no syntax or format guidance beyond what the schema provides, matching the baseline-3 case.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific function — an identity-verification protocol for remote engineering hires that produces a red-flag log for one candidate — and enumerates the threat classes it addresses (fake candidates, stand-ins, DPRK IT-worker schemes). It is distinguishable from near-siblings like detect_resume_injection and verify_work_email, though it does not explicitly name those alternatives.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The phrase 'Same checks for every finalist' implies the tool is used at the finalist stage, which is a weak usage cue. There is no explicit when-to-use/when-not statement and no routing to siblings such as detect_resume_injection or plan_reference_check, so selection still requires inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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