Robot Actions — Remote Device Control

ios_traffic_mock_add

Add (or update in place, if id matches an existing route) a mock/abort rule that short-circuits future matching HTTPS requests on this device inside the TLS-inspecting proxy — the request never reaches the real server. mode "mock" (default) returns the given status/headers/body; mode "abort" kills the connection so the app sees a network failure. Requires TLS capture to already be running on this device (ios_traffic_start) — routes are stored per-device and take effect live, no restart needed. Certificate-pinned apps cannot be intercepted at all (same limit as capture itself), so a route targeting pinned traffic will simply never match.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description
`id`	No	Route id to update in place (replaces the existing route); omit to auto-generate a new one
`body`	No	Response body to inject for mode "mock" (text, or base64 when bodyEncoding is "base64")
`mode`	No	"mock" injects a canned response (default); "abort" kills the connection
`udid`	Yes	iOS device UDID
`method`	No	Optional HTTP method filter (e.g. "GET"/"POST"); matches any method when omitted
`status`	No	HTTP status to inject for mode "mock" (default 200)
`delayMs`	No	Latency to inject before responding/aborting, in ms (clamped to 60s server-side)
`enabled`	No	Whether the route is active (default true) — disabled routes are kept but ignored
`headers`	No	Response headers to inject for mode "mock", as {headerName: value} — e.g. {"content-type": "application/json"}
`matchUrl`	Yes	URL pattern to match against the request's full URL
`matchType`	No	How matchUrl is interpreted against the request URL (default "contains")
`bodyEncoding`	No	Encoding of `body` (default "text")

TDQS

A4.2/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden. It discloses the short-circuit behavior, mode outcomes (mock returns status/headers/body, abort kills connection), live application of routes, and the pinned-app limitation. It does not mention edge cases like overlapping rules or persistence semantics, but overall it is highly transparent.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is four dense sentences, front-loaded with the primary action, then modes, prerequisites, and limitations. Every sentence earns its place without redundancy, making it an efficient and well-structured description.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given 12 parameters, no annotations, and no output schema, the description covers key contextual needs: prerequisites, effect, and constraints. It lacks return-value details and explicit examples, but for an add/update tool, the provided context is largely sufficient.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The schema provides a 100% coverage with detailed descriptions for all 12 parameters, including enums and defaults. The description reinforces the mode semantics but doesn't add new parameter-level details beyond what the schema already offers. Baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description starts with a specific verb ('Add or update') and a specific resource (mock/abort rule for HTTPS requests on an iOS device via TLS proxy). It distinguishes itself from siblings by naming the platform (ios) and the traffic interception mechanism, while also explaining the two modes (mock/abort) that affect behavior.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It explicitly states a prerequisite ('Requires TLS capture to already be running on this device (ios_traffic_start)') and a limitation ('Certificate-pinned apps cannot be intercepted at all'). This gives clear context for when to use the tool, though it does not explicitly compare to alternatives like ios_traffic_mock_remove.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

B3.1/5.0

Disambiguation2/5

The set contains near-identical duplicate families: web_* and playwright_* expose ~15 pairs of the same desktop-grid-browser operations (web_get_text/playwright_get_text, web_reload/playwright_reload), and screenshot/log/network/mock capabilities each have 5-8 entry points (device_screenshot vs android_mjpeg_screenshot vs ios_screenshot vs ios_fast_screenshot vs web_screenshot vs webpage_screenshot vs session_screenshot). Many individual descriptions carefully draw boundaries (devtools vs traffic, HID vs session), but an agent cannot reliably distinguish web_* from playwright_*, and ios_screenshot/ios_fast_screenshot/ios_mjpeg_screenshot blur together.

Naming Consistency2/5

The prefix scheme is broken: Android functionality is split arbitrarily between android_* and device_* (device_screenshot vs android_mjpeg_screenshot), the desktop browser gets two parallel prefixes (web_* and playwright_*), and verbs vary across equivalents (device_navigate_url vs web_navigate vs ios_safari_navigate). session_* uses bare verbs (session_url, session_back), and the same concept gets different names (ios_clipboard_get_hid vs ios_get_pasteboard; device_screen vs ios_orientation).

Tool Count1/5

333 tools is an extreme count by any measure — far beyond the 50+ threshold — and much of the bulk is duplicative (the web_*/playwright_* pairs alone double ~15 slots) or out-of-scope for a device-control server (TestRail, Jira, AzDO, agent memory, secret variables, feedback). Even granting that remote device control + test automation is a broad domain, this surface will devastate agent context budgets and is impossible to navigate coherently.

Completeness4/5

The core device-control and test-automation domain is remarkably thorough: Android and iOS each have full interaction, app-lifecycle, file, network/proxy, performance, crash, accessibility, recording, and replay coverage, with CRUD lifecycles for flows, suites, app uploads, TestRail cases, and visual-review baselines. Minor gaps exist at the margins — Jira/AzDO lack update/transition/comment operations, and iOS cannot open/close tabs — but the central workflows have no dead ends.

Resources

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