Kill an app on an iOS device by bundle ID, process ID, or process name. No automation session required.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| pid | No | Process ID to kill | |
| udid | Yes | iOS device UDID | |
| bundleId | No | App bundle ID to kill | |
| processName | No | Process name to kill |
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries full burden for behavioral disclosure. 'Kill' communicates the destructive/mutating nature, and 'No automation session required' is useful. However, it doesn't disclose whether killing an app has side effects (data loss, restart behavior), permission requirements, or whether it's reversible (the app can be relaunched). Given the destructive nature, more explicit disclosure would be expected.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences, both information-dense. The first sentence states the action and its alternatives; the second adds the key prerequisite-free context. No wasted words or redundant phrasing.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a single-action utility tool with 1 required parameter and no output schema, the description provides adequate top-level context including the no-session-needed detail. The main gap is clarifying identifier precedence/mutual exclusivity among pid, bundleId, and processName, but overall this is reasonably complete for a straightforward kill operation.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline of 3 applies. The description reiterates that killing can be done by bundle ID, PID, or process name, which maps to the three identifier parameters, but adds no additional semantics beyond what the schema already documents. It doesn't clarify precedence if multiple identifiers are provided, which is a gap given there are three mutually-exclusive ways to target an app.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific imperative verb ('Kill') with a clear resource ('an app on an iOS device') and specifies the three accepted identifier types (bundle ID, process ID, or process name). It clearly distinguishes from siblings like device_terminate_app, ios_terminate_app, and ios_launch_app by noting this is a kill operation, although it doesn't explicitly differentiate from the terminate_app siblings.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description states 'No automation session required,' which is a meaningful usage context that distinguishes it from session-dependent iOS operations like ios_start_session/ios_end_session. However, it doesn't explicitly name alternative tools or give clear when-not-to-use guidance, e.g., when device_terminate_app might be preferred over ios_kill_app.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
The set contains near-identical duplicate families: web_* and playwright_* expose ~15 pairs of the same desktop-grid-browser operations (web_get_text/playwright_get_text, web_reload/playwright_reload), and screenshot/log/network/mock capabilities each have 5-8 entry points (device_screenshot vs android_mjpeg_screenshot vs ios_screenshot vs ios_fast_screenshot vs web_screenshot vs webpage_screenshot vs session_screenshot). Many individual descriptions carefully draw boundaries (devtools vs traffic, HID vs session), but an agent cannot reliably distinguish web_* from playwright_*, and ios_screenshot/ios_fast_screenshot/ios_mjpeg_screenshot blur together.
The prefix scheme is broken: Android functionality is split arbitrarily between android_* and device_* (device_screenshot vs android_mjpeg_screenshot), the desktop browser gets two parallel prefixes (web_* and playwright_*), and verbs vary across equivalents (device_navigate_url vs web_navigate vs ios_safari_navigate). session_* uses bare verbs (session_url, session_back), and the same concept gets different names (ios_clipboard_get_hid vs ios_get_pasteboard; device_screen vs ios_orientation).
333 tools is an extreme count by any measure — far beyond the 50+ threshold — and much of the bulk is duplicative (the web_*/playwright_* pairs alone double ~15 slots) or out-of-scope for a device-control server (TestRail, Jira, AzDO, agent memory, secret variables, feedback). Even granting that remote device control + test automation is a broad domain, this surface will devastate agent context budgets and is impossible to navigate coherently.
The core device-control and test-automation domain is remarkably thorough: Android and iOS each have full interaction, app-lifecycle, file, network/proxy, performance, crash, accessibility, recording, and replay coverage, with CRUD lifecycles for flows, suites, app uploads, TestRail cases, and visual-review baselines. Minor gaps exist at the margins — Jira/AzDO lack update/transition/comment operations, and iOS cannot open/close tabs — but the central workflows have no dead ends.
