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Robot Actions — Remote Device Control

android_traffic_mock_add

Add (or update in place, if id matches an existing route) a mock/abort rule that short-circuits future matching HTTPS requests on this device inside the TLS-inspecting proxy — the request never reaches the real server. mode "mock" (default) returns the given status/headers/body; mode "abort" kills the connection so the app sees a network failure. Requires TLS capture to already be running on this device (android_traffic_start) — routes are stored per-device and take effect live, no restart needed. Certificate-pinned apps cannot be intercepted at all (same limit as capture itself), so a route targeting pinned traffic will simply never match.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idNoRoute id to update in place (replaces the existing route); omit to auto-generate a new one
bodyNoResponse body to inject for mode "mock" (text, or base64 when bodyEncoding is "base64")
modeNo"mock" injects a canned response (default); "abort" kills the connection
methodNoOptional HTTP method filter (e.g. "GET"/"POST"); matches any method when omitted
serialYesAndroid device serial (adb serial)
statusNoHTTP status to inject for mode "mock" (default 200)
delayMsNoLatency to inject before responding/aborting, in ms (clamped to 60s server-side)
enabledNoWhether the route is active (default true) — disabled routes are kept but ignored
headersNoResponse headers to inject for mode "mock", as {headerName: value} — e.g. {"content-type": "application/json"}
matchUrlYesURL pattern to match against the request's full URL
matchTypeNoHow matchUrl is interpreted against the request URL (default "contains")
bodyEncodingNoEncoding of `body` (default "text")

TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries full burden and discloses key behaviors: requests never reach the server, mock vs abort modes, live per-device storage without restart, and the pinned-app limitation. This is notably transparent for a state-changing proxy tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three well-structured sentences: core function, mode explanation, then prerequisites/limits. Every sentence adds valuable information without redundancy or fluff.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a complex 12-parameter tool without an output schema, the description covers the main behaviors, prerequisites, and limitations. Missing return value info and potential error conditions, but the overall context is strong.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so baseline is 3. The description adds semantic context for mode/status/headers/body by explaining mock vs abort behavior, and clarifies id-based update-in-place, going beyond the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool's action (add or update in place), resource (mock/abort rule), and context (TLS-inspecting proxy for device HTTPS traffic). It distinguishes from sibling list/remove tools by detailing the short-circuiting behavior and update semantics.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Provides a clear prerequisite (requires TLS capture via android_traffic_start) and a limitation (pinned apps won't be intercepted), giving context for when this tool is appropriate. However, it doesn't explicitly name alternative mocking tools or state when not to use it beyond the pinned-app case.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

B3.1/5.0
Disambiguation2/5

The set contains near-identical duplicate families: web_* and playwright_* expose ~15 pairs of the same desktop-grid-browser operations (web_get_text/playwright_get_text, web_reload/playwright_reload), and screenshot/log/network/mock capabilities each have 5-8 entry points (device_screenshot vs android_mjpeg_screenshot vs ios_screenshot vs ios_fast_screenshot vs web_screenshot vs webpage_screenshot vs session_screenshot). Many individual descriptions carefully draw boundaries (devtools vs traffic, HID vs session), but an agent cannot reliably distinguish web_* from playwright_*, and ios_screenshot/ios_fast_screenshot/ios_mjpeg_screenshot blur together.

Naming Consistency2/5

The prefix scheme is broken: Android functionality is split arbitrarily between android_* and device_* (device_screenshot vs android_mjpeg_screenshot), the desktop browser gets two parallel prefixes (web_* and playwright_*), and verbs vary across equivalents (device_navigate_url vs web_navigate vs ios_safari_navigate). session_* uses bare verbs (session_url, session_back), and the same concept gets different names (ios_clipboard_get_hid vs ios_get_pasteboard; device_screen vs ios_orientation).

Tool Count1/5

333 tools is an extreme count by any measure — far beyond the 50+ threshold — and much of the bulk is duplicative (the web_*/playwright_* pairs alone double ~15 slots) or out-of-scope for a device-control server (TestRail, Jira, AzDO, agent memory, secret variables, feedback). Even granting that remote device control + test automation is a broad domain, this surface will devastate agent context budgets and is impossible to navigate coherently.

Completeness4/5

The core device-control and test-automation domain is remarkably thorough: Android and iOS each have full interaction, app-lifecycle, file, network/proxy, performance, crash, accessibility, recording, and replay coverage, with CRUD lifecycles for flows, suites, app uploads, TestRail cases, and visual-review baselines. Minor gaps exist at the margins — Jira/AzDO lack update/transition/comment operations, and iOS cannot open/close tabs — but the central workflows have no dead ends.

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