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ringkit_revoke_api_key

Destructive

Step 11: Manage API keys. Revoke an API key (keyId from list_api_keys); it stops authenticating at once, including on this connection if it is this key. Reuse an idempotencyKey when retrying; without one, each call executes again.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
keyIdYesThe key's id (from list_api_keys).
businessIdNoDefaults to the business of the API key in the Authorization header.
idempotencyKeyNoOptional. Retries of the same call should reuse it (the stored result comes back); a new value deliberately repeats an identical call. The MCP POST's Idempotency-Key header takes precedence.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes well beyond the supplied annotations (destructiveHint=true, idempotentHint=false) by disclosing the immediate effect ('stops authenticating at once') and the non-obvious edge case that revoking the current connection's own key kills this session. The idempotency sentence also explains the retry consequence rather than merely restating idempotentHint=false.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three tight sentences, with the destructive consequence and the self-revocation caveat front-loaded before the retry note. The leading 'Step 11: Manage API keys.' is workflow scaffolding that adds little for tool selection but is brief enough not to be costly.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, three-parameter mutation with no output schema, the description covers the effect, the session-level risk, and the idempotent retry model. The only gap is what a successful call returns, which is a minor omission given there is no output schema to lean on.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so keyId, businessId, and idempotencyKey are already fully documented, including the Idempotency-Key header precedence rule. The description restates the keyId origin and the retry semantics without adding format or constraint detail beyond the schema, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Revoke an API key') and immediately identifies the required input's origin ('keyId from list_api_keys'), which cleanly separates it from the sibling ringkit_create_api_key and ringkit_list_api_keys. An agent can pick this tool without opening the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Points at list_api_keys as the source of the identifier and gives explicit retry guidance (reuse an idempotencyKey), which is real when-to-use context. It does not state any when-not condition or warn about revoking keys in use beyond the self-revocation case, so it falls just short of full routing guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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