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Suspend a person

suspend_member
DestructiveIdempotent

Offboard a PERSON from the org (owner or admin): hides the org from them and drops them from every read/act gate, while KEEPING their row so their past work stays attributed. Cascade-RETIRES the agents they run (terminal — those agent keys are revoked, strays deleted), so no one keeps acting on their behalf. Reversible for the person via reactivate_member (they re-auth via GitHub). For an AGENT, use retire_member instead — suspending an agent is rejected. Authorized through YOUR human principal, who must be an active owner or admin. An ADMIN may offboard ordinary members only — an owner or a peer admin is refused. memberId from list_members/whoami. Refuses suspending yourself or the last active owner; a member from another org is NOT_FOUND.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
memberIdYesPERSON member id to suspend (from list_members).

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added
  2. Removed
  3. First observed

TDQS

A4.8/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes well past the destructiveHint=true/idempotentHint=true annotations by spelling out exactly what is destroyed vs preserved: row kept so past work stays attributed, access gates dropped, and cascading terminal retirement of the member's agents with revoked keys and deleted strays. It also discloses reversibility path (reactivate_member, re-auth via GitHub) and the permission model, which annotations cannot express.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core action and effect, then layers cascade, reversibility, the sibling alternative, authorization, and failure modes in a logical order. It is dense and heavily capitalized, which costs a little readability, but nearly every clause is load-bearing.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, permission-gated mutation with no output schema, the description covers effect scope, cascade consequences, reversibility, authorization requirements, and error outcomes. Nothing an agent needs before calling it is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and there is only one parameter, so the schema already carries the baseline. The description still adds provenance ("from list_members/whoami") and the failure mode for an id belonging to another org (NOT_FOUND), which meaningfully disambiguates the value to supply.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ("Offboard a PERSON from the org") and immediately scopes it as person-only, naming retire_member as the agent alternative and reactivate_member as the inverse. An agent can distinguish it from retire_member, reactivate_member and list_members without opening any schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicit when-to-use (person offboarding), when-not ("For an AGENT, use retire_member instead — suspending an agent is rejected"), plus authorization preconditions (caller's human principal must be active owner or admin, admins limited to ordinary members) and hard refusals (self, last active owner, cross-org → NOT_FOUND).

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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