RetailHardHat

Delete Site

delete_site

Destructive

Use this when working with RetailHardHat sites records in the connected organization. Delete site. Subject to configured MCP approval rules; may cascade to related records. No change occurs until a human approves the exact request in Settings > MCP and execute_approved_action is called. MCP approval requirements are configurable by the organization administrator; business workflow approvals always apply.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "id": "<id>"
    },
    "name": "delete_site"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`id`	Yes

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`data`	Yes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedOct 27, 2026

TDQS

A3.7/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, so the description's added value is in disclosing cascade behavior and the human-approval gate requiring execute_approved_action. It does not specify which related records may be cascaded or whether the delete is reversible, but it adds meaningful behavioral context beyond the annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is reasonably concise and front-loads the delete operation, but the first sentence is generic boilerplate and the approval-rule language is repeated. It could be tightened without losing the important cascade and approval details.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a simple destructive tool with an output schema and destructive annotation, the description covers the key operational context: approval gating and possible cascade. It does not describe invalid-id behavior or permission requirements, but the essential calling context is present.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

There is only one required parameter, id, and the schema defines it as a UUID without a description. The description does not explain the id parameter, but its meaning is inferable from the tool name and schema format. Baseline is limited because schema coverage is 0% and the description adds no parameter semantics.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource: 'Delete site' on RetailHardHat sites records. It is clear enough to distinguish the operation from update_site and delete_site_document, but it does not explicitly differentiate itself from sibling tools or explain the scope of what 'site' means.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is implied by the operation name and the approval context, but the description does not say when to choose this tool versus update_site, delete_site_document, or any alternative. It also provides no when-not guidance beyond stating that approval is required.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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