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Layer-9 Inner-CPI Solana Transaction Drainer Simulator

simulate_solana_tx_drain
Read-onlyIdempotent

Pre-sign Layer-9 Inner-CPI Solana transaction drainer check. Inspects base64 or base58 serialized transactions before wallet signing to block malicious inner CPI SOL drains, stealth SPL Approve/SetAuthority delegations, creator-vault rent traps, and unexpected balance deltas.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "transaction": "<transaction>"
    },
    "name": "simulate_solana_tx_drain"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
walletNoOptional fee-payer/signer Solana wallet public key (base58).
encodingNoEncoding of the serialized transaction ('base64' or 'base58').base64
x_paymentNoOptional base64 or JSON Solana x402 payment payload (X-Payment / PAYMENT-SIGNATURE) for automatic HTTP 402 settlement.
transactionYesSerialized Solana transaction (unsigned or signed) in base64 or base58.
pro_pass_tokenNoOptional X-Pro-Pass-Token from Option A Unlimited Pro Pass.
payment_signatureNoOptional confirmed Solana transaction signature paying 89Sv5FvnMNRid1bn8y2Ti1vJPSxWxgiW9GSLsPpBnKK1 for x402 retry.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.6/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, idempotentHint=true, destructiveHint=false, so the safety profile is covered and the description correctly does not contradict it. It adds real value by naming the specific attack patterns detected and the pre-signature timing. However, it never says what the tool returns (a verdict, risk score, findings list) despite there being no output schema, and it is silent on the x402/payment gating implied by x_payment, payment_signature, and pro_pass_token.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two dense sentences with the pre-sign gating front-loaded and no filler. The threat list is long but each item is a distinct, actionable signal rather than padding, though the 'Layer-9 Inner-CPI' branding is jargon that consumes space without adding selection value.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a read-only inspection tool with a fully documented 6-parameter schema, the description covers purpose, timing, and threat model adequately. The remaining gap is the absence of any indication of what a call produces and whether payment settlement is required for a successful response, which matters because there is no output schema to fall back on.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so every parameter including encoding, wallet, and the payment fields is already documented in the schema. The description only echoes the base64/base58 encoding choice already stated in the schema, adding no new meaning about how wallet, encoding, or payment parameters interact. Baseline 3 applies when the schema carries the parameter burden.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource: it 'Inspects base64 or base58 serialized transactions before wallet signing' and enumerates the threat classes it blocks (inner CPI SOL drains, SPL Approve/SetAuthority delegations, rent traps, balance deltas). That is far more concrete than the name alone, though it never contrasts itself with the sibling audit/scan tools, so an agent must infer the boundary. Minor friction: the name/title say 'simulator' while the description frames it as a 'check/inspection'.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The timing cue 'Pre-sign ... before wallet signing' is an explicit use condition and tells the agent exactly when to reach for this tool. There is no statement of when not to use it, no mention of alternatives such as audit_solana_token_10_layer, and no note about prerequisites like the payment parameters.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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