ProxyRange

Residential proxy brands that share infrastructure

shared_infrastructure

Read-onlyIdempotent

Which residential proxy brands share infrastructure (their proxy gateways answer from the same addresses or resolve through the same DNS target), for one provider or for every brand ProxyRange covers. A gateway that is an alias of another brand’s host goes through that host; shared addresses alone are a technical link that doesn’t show who runs the network.

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`provider`	No	One provider id, name or website; leave out to list every brand that shares infrastructure

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description
`note`	Yes
`brands`	Yes
`licence`	Yes
`updated`	Yes	The newest date any fact in the data was checked (YYYY-MM-DD)
`howToRead`	Yes
`attribution`	Yes	How to credit the data when you show it
`corrections`	Yes
`rightOfReply`	Yes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed8 schema fields changedOct 28, 2026

addedOutput schema / properties / brands / items / properties / sharesWith / items / properties / evidence

Added value: +{
+  "description": "What public DNS showed, with hostnames but never addresses",
+  "items": {
+    "type": "string"
+  },
+  "type": "array"
+}

addedOutput schema / properties / brands / items / properties / sharesWith / items / properties / firstSeen

Added value: +{
+  "anyOf": [
+    {
+      "description": "YYYY-MM-DD",
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "null"
+    }
+  ]
+}

addedOutput schema / properties / brands / items / properties / sharesWith / items / properties / lastSeen

Added value: +{
+  "anyOf": [
+    {
+      "description": "YYYY-MM-DD",
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "null"
+    }
+  ],
+  "description": "The last infrastructure map that still saw it"
+}

changedOutput schema / properties / brands / items / properties / sharesWith / items / required

Previous value: -[
-  "id",
-  "name",
-  "page",
-  "how"
-]New value: +[
+  "id",
+  "name",
+  "page",
+  "how",
+  "evidence",
+  "firstSeen",
+  "lastSeen"
+]

addedOutput schema / properties / corrections
```
Added value: +{
+  "type": "string"
+}
```
addedOutput schema / properties / howToRead
```
Added value: +{
+  "type": "string"
+}
```
addedOutput schema / properties / rightOfReply
```
Added value: +{
+  "type": "string"
+}
```

changedOutput schema / required

Previous value: -[
-  "brands",
-  "note",
-  "updated",
-  "attribution",
-  "licence"
-]New value: +[
+  "brands",
+  "note",
+  "howToRead",
+  "rightOfReply",
+  "corrections",
+  "updated",
+  "attribution",
+  "licence"
+]

First observedOct 28, 2026

TDQS

A3.7/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare this is a read-only, idempotent, closed-world query, so safety is covered. The description adds genuine interpretive context: an alias gateway routes through the other brand's host, and shared addresses alone are only a technical link that does not establish who runs the network. That caveat directly shapes how an agent should read and trust the result.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two sentences, front-loaded with the resource and its definition, followed by the caveat that qualifies the result. The second sentence is dense but earns its place by preventing over-interpretation of shared addresses. Minor cost is the jargon-heavy phrasing.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values need not be explained, and annotations cover the safety profile. With one optional parameter and a clear statement of what counts as shared infrastructure plus the interpretation caveat, an agent has enough to call it correctly. Explicit sibling routing is the only missing piece.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and the single optional parameter already documents that omitting it lists every brand. The description restates the same all-brands behavior without adding format or matching semantics beyond what the schema says. Baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states precisely what is returned: which residential proxy brands share infrastructure, with a parenthetical defining the evidence (same answering addresses or same DNS target). It covers both the single-provider and all-brands scope, so an agent knows the shape of the answer. It does not name a sibling to contrast with, leaving differentiation to inference.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is only implied: 'for one provider or for every brand ProxyRange covers' suggests the optional-parameter pattern but never says when an agent should reach for this tool instead of compare_providers or get_provider. There are no exclusions or prerequisites stated.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

All ProxyRange tools Inspect

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