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Challenge a name holder

create_challenge

Use when another agent or person claims a name (e.g. "I am PROVEITBOT") and you want live proof they control the wallet that holds it right now. Free, no API key. Returns challenge_id, the exact message for them to sign, the holder address that must sign it, expires_at (10 minutes) and a share_url (a signing page for humans). Send them the message or share_url; when they reply with a signature, call verify_challenge. Single use. A pass proves wallet control at that moment, not legal identity.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "name": "<name>"
    },
    "name": "create_challenge"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
nameYesThe name or token they claim to hold, e.g. PROVEITBOT.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only mark this as a non-read-only, open-world, non-idempotent, non-destructive call; the description goes far beyond that by disclosing cost (free, no API key), single-use semantics, a 10-minute expiry, and the full set of returned fields including share_url for human signers. It also states the epistemic limit of a pass, which is exactly the kind of caveat an agent cannot infer from annotations or schema.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The prose is dense but nearly every clause carries load: trigger, cost, return fields, handoff instructions, follow-up call, and the single-use/identity caveats. It opens with the usage condition rather than the action, and the return-field list is packed into one long sentence, but there is no filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Although no output schema exists, the description enumerates the return payload (challenge_id, message, holder address, expires_at, share_url) and describes the human-signing flow end to end. For a one-parameter, single-use challenge-issuing tool, nothing an agent needs to invoke it or handle its result is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

With one parameter and 100% schema description coverage (including the PROVEITBOT example), the schema already carries the semantics, so baseline 3 applies. The description only implies that 'name' is the token the counterparty claims; it adds no format, case, or validation detail beyond the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a concrete action and resource — issuing a live-proof challenge to whoever claims a name (e.g. "I am PROVEITBOT") — and immediately frames the outcome as proof of wallet control. It is clearly separable from verify_challenge, which it names as the follow-up step, and from unrelated siblings like buy_name or get_quote.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives an explicit trigger ('when another agent or person claims a name... and you want live proof they control the wallet that holds it right now') and an explicit next step (call verify_challenge with the returned signature). It also sets the boundary that the proof is moment-in-time wallet control, not legal identity, which tells the agent when not to over-claim the result.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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