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Protect site

protect
Destructive

Protects a site or one path (owner): passcode (protect_url, where the user sets it, never in chat) or members ("/": invite-only, users via add_people; a path: the emails who may see it). list_people shows it.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
modeNoRequired unless confirm_token
pathNo"/" (default, whole site) or a part such as /students
siteYes
emailsNomembers on a path: everyone who may see it (omit: the site's list)
confirm_tokenNo

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
protectedNo
approve_urlNo
members_onlyNo
agent_messageNo
confirm_tokenNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / mode / enum
      Previous value: -[
      -  "passcode",
      -  "members"
      -]New value: +[
      +  "passcode",
      +  "members",
      +  "internal"
      +]
  2. Changed4 schema fields changed
    • addedOutput schema / properties / agent_message
      Added value: +{
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
    • addedOutput schema / properties / approve_url
      Added value: +{
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
    • addedOutput schema / properties / members_only
      Added value: +{
      +  "type": "boolean"
      +}
    • addedOutput schema / properties / protected
      Added value: +{
      +  "type": "boolean"
      +}
  3. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / emails / description
      Previous value: -"members on a path: the full list who may see it (shared plans: omit to reuse the site's list)"New value: +"members on a path: everyone who may see it (omit: the site's list)"
  4. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedOutput schema / (root)
      Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
      +  "properties": {
      +    "confirm_token": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    }
      +  },
      +  "type": "object"
      +}
  5. Changed1 schema field changed
    • removedInput schema / properties / confirm_token / description
      Removed value: -"From the first call"
  6. Changed2 schema fields changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / confirm_token / description
      Previous value: -"From the first call: approval status"New value: +"From the first call"
    • removedInput schema / properties / site / description
      Removed value: -"Site name"
  7. Changed3 schema fields changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / confirm_token / description
      Previous value: -"From the first call: re-call with it for the approval status"New value: +"From the first call: approval status"
    • changedInput schema / properties / site / description
      Previous value: -"Site name, e.g. brave-otter-4821"New value: +"Site name"
    • changedOutput schema / (root)
      Previous value: -{
      -  "additionalProperties": {},
      -  "properties": {
      -    "agent_message": {
      -      "type": "string"
      -    },
      -    "confirm_token": {
      -      "type": "string"
      -    },
      -    "error": {
      -      "description": "On failure (isError): {code, message}"
      -    }
      -  },
      -  "type": "object"
      -}New value: +null
  8. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / mode / enum
      Previous value: -[
      -  "passcode",
      -  "members",
      -  "public"
      -]New value: +[
      +  "passcode",
      +  "members"
      +]
  9. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / emails / description
      Previous value: -"members on a path: the full list who may see it"New value: +"members on a path: the full list who may see it (shared plans: omit to reuse the site's list)"
  10. First observed

TDQS

A3.7/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=false, so the safety profile is known. The description adds important operational context: passcodes are set via protect_url and never in chat, and member lists are managed through add_people. It does not explain the 'internal' mode, but overall adds value beyond structured fields.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is a single dense sentence with nested parentheses and semicolons; it is front-loaded and contains no filler, but the structure is cramped and harder to parse than necessary.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given a destructive mutation with annotations covering safety and an output schema, the description covers the main modes and security-sensitive passcode handling. However, the unexplained 'internal' mode and confirm_token leave the agent with gaps for a 5-parameter tool.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 60% and the description clarifies the mode choices (passcode vs members) and the meaning of path ('/' whole site or a part) and emails. It omits the 'internal' mode and the confirm_token parameter, leaving gaps that the schema also does not fully cover.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb ('Protects') and resource ('site or one path'), and distinguishes the passcode and members modes with concrete constraints. It does not explicitly contrast with the sibling 'unprotect', but the purpose is clear.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explains when to choose passcode (set via protect_url, never in chat) vs members (invite-only via add_people on '/', or emails on a path), and points to list_people for verification. Lacks explicit when-not guidance, but mode selection is well covered.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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