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Supplier Proof: revoke a certificate

supplier_cert_revoke
DestructiveIdempotent

Revoke a certificate you issued (as the buyer). Verification shows it as revoked at once. Requires the organization API key.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "cert_id": "<cert_id>",
      "reason": "<reason>"
    },
    "name": "supplier_cert_revoke"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
reasonYesWhy it is revoked
cert_idYesCertificate ID (spc_...)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A3.8/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=true, so the description's job is to add context — and it does: the effect is immediate ('Verification shows it as revoked at once') and an organization API key is required. That propagation timing and auth prerequisite are genuinely beyond the structured fields. It stops short of saying whether revocation is reversible or whether the reason is surfaced to the supplier.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two short sentences with zero filler, front-loading the core action and role before the effect and the auth requirement. Nothing is repeated from the title or schema.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a two-parameter destructive mutation, the description covers the action, the actor, the immediate effect, and the auth requirement, while parameters are fully covered by the schema and no output schema exists to explain. The only gap is irreversibility and the downstream consequence for existing verifications — minor but not trivial for a destructive op.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so both parameters (cert_id as spc_..., reason as 'Why it is revoked') are already documented and the baseline is 3. The description adds nothing further about format, length, or whether reason is exposed externally, so it neither compensates nor detracts.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (revoke) and resource (certificate) plus the acting role ('as the buyer'), which separates it from supplier_cert_verify and supplier_certs. It does not explicitly differentiate itself from other revoke-style siblings such as seal_revoke, passport_revoke, or mandate_revoke, so an agent must infer scope from the name and role clause.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description identifies the caller role (buyer who issued the cert) and the required credential (organization API key), which is usable context. However, it never states when to revoke versus when to use supplier_cert_verify or supplier_proof_decide, and gives no exclusions or failure conditions, leaving the routing decision implied.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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