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Detectar archivos de configuración/instrucciones envenenados

detect_poisoned_config_files

Analiza archivos de configuración/instrucciones que un agente de código carga y confía DE INMEDIATO, sin ningún paso de aprobación (AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, archivos de "skills", y similares), en busca de instrucciones ocultas o peligrosas. Reutiliza el mismo motor de detect_poisoned_tool_descriptions (Garita Escudo) — caracteres invisibles, esteganografía Unicode, homoglifos, entidades HTML en capas, bloques de pseudo-instrucción escondidos, instrucciones de ocultar la acción al usuario, de manipular OTRA herramienta, de redirigir datos, de decodificar y seguir texto codificado, y el gatillo diferido tipo "rug-pull" — pero AJUSTADO a este género de archivo: el lenguaje de autoridad (IMPORTANTE, CRÍTICO) no se penaliza aquí porque es normal y esperado en un archivo de instrucciones, y se agrega una regla nueva, "filtración de credenciales", que no necesita ningún gatillo temporal — una instrucción de leer y exponer el contenido de un archivo de credenciales/secretos se marca de inmediato, porque a diferencia de una herramienta MCP, un archivo de instrucciones se confía sin pedir aprobación a nadie. Motivada por un caso real (2026): un archivo de reglas envenenado exfiltró credenciales de AWS/Kubernetes/Terraform en menos de 2 minutos en una prueba controlada. Acepta uno o varios archivos a la vez. Requiere una llave de acceso válida (usos gratis o créditos) — ver POST /crear-llave.

Tool call template

This tool declares no required parameters. Add optional parameters from the input schema as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {},
    "name": "detect_poisoned_config_files"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
rutaNoSolo junto con "contenido": el nombre/ruta de ese archivo suelto.
archivosNoUno o más archivos a revisar a la vez: [{ ruta, contenido }, ...].
contenidoNoAlternativa a "archivos": el contenido de un solo archivo suelto, en texto plano.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does substantial work: it enumerates the detection categories (invisible characters, Unicode steganography, homoglyphs, layered HTML entities, hidden pseudo-instructions), discloses the new 'credential exfiltration' rule that fires with no temporal trigger, and states the auth/credit requirement up front. It also helpfully discloses a negative rule — authority language is NOT penalized here — which prevents misreading results. It omits how findings are returned or scored, which is the main remaining gap.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The purpose is front-loaded in the first clause, but the body is one dense run-on paragraph with stacked parentheticals, em-dashes, and an inline detection catalog that is hard to parse. The motivated-by-a-2026-real-case anecdote and the 'Garita Escudo' branding add color but are expendable; the substantive rules around them earn their place.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a security scanner with no annotations and no output schema, the description covers inputs, scope, detection rules, auth, and the genre-specific tuning well. The notable omission is the return shape — since there is no output schema, the description should say what a report contains (per-file findings, severity, matched snippets), which it only hints at via 'para identificarlo en el reporte'.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents ruta, archivos, and contenido, including the single-file alternative relationship. The description adds little beyond restating 'Acepta uno o varios archivos a la vez', which largely duplicates the schema's own note. Baseline 3 is the correct ceiling here.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Opening sentence gives a specific verb ('Analiza') and a precisely scoped resource — config/instruction files an agent loads and trusts immediately without approval — with concrete examples (AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, skills files). It explicitly differentiates itself from the closest sibling detect_poisoned_tool_descriptions by explaining it reuses the same engine but adjusts it for this file genre, so an agent can pick between the two without opening either schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description makes the selection condition clear: use this on instruction/config files, not MCP tool descriptions, and it explains why (these are trusted with no approval step). It also states it accepts one or several files and that an access key from POST /crear-llave is required. It stops short of naming explicit exclusion cases beyond the sibling contrast, so a 4 rather than a 5.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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