Skip to main content
Glama

Escudo de Suplantación de Llamada

detect_call_spoofing_risk

Analiza el código de orquestación del lado del AGENTE (la capa que interpreta la respuesta del modelo) en busca de la extracción de llamadas a herramientas desde el TEXTO LIBRE de la respuesta (una marca como TOOL_CALL:, un bloque ```json, una etiqueta <tool_call>) en vez de leerlas únicamente del campo ESTRUCTURADO y dedicado de la API (tool_calls/function_call/tool_use), que solo se llena cuando el modelo invocó de verdad el mecanismo nativo de function-calling. Contenido que solo PARECE una llamada a herramienta — incrustado en un documento, una página web o el resultado de otra herramienta que el modelo simplemente "repite" — puede terminar ejecutado como si fuera real (ataque "Repeat-After-Me", documentado en octubre de 2026 contra 6 frameworks de agentes de uso extendido: LangGraph, Microsoft Agent Framework, Google ADK 2.0, AutoGen, AWS Strands y CrewAI). Es un análisis estático por patrones de texto (no ejecuta el código) — mismo enfoque que detect_sampling_hijack_risk y detect_toxic_flow_risk. Requiere una llave de acceso válida (usos gratis o créditos) — ver POST /crear-llave.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "codigo": "<codigo>"
    },
    "name": "detect_call_spoofing_risk"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
codigoYesEl código de orquestación del lado del agente que interpreta la respuesta del modelo, en texto plano.
lenguajeNoSolo informativo (ej. "python") — este campo no cambia el resultado.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations supplied, the description carries the full load and does well: it discloses that this is static text-pattern analysis that does NOT execute the code, that authentication is required, and what class of risk it targets. It stops short of describing the response shape (score vs. finding list), severity semantics, or any limits on code size, which leaves real gaps for a no-annotation tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core purpose in the first clause, then adds risk rationale, then operational constraints. It is a single dense paragraph and the research citation (October 2026, six named frameworks) is context rather than instruction, but nothing is misleading and the ordering is sensible.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a tool with no annotations and no output schema, the description covers purpose, static-analysis behavior, and auth, but never tells the agent what comes back (risk verdict, matched patterns, severity) or how to interpret it. That missing return-value framing is the main completeness gap given the absence of an output schema.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so both parameters are already documented in the schema. The description reinforces what `codigo` should contain but adds no format or size guidance, and it never mentions `lenguaje` (which the schema itself marks as informational and non-behavioral). Baseline 3 applies since the schema does the heavy lifting.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and target: static analysis of AGENT-side orchestration code looking for tool-call extraction from free-text model output (TOOL_CALL:, ```json blocks, <tool_call> tags) instead of the structured tool_calls/function_call/tool_use field. It even names the attack class (Repeat-After-Me) and positions itself against siblings by saying it uses the same approach as detect_sampling_hijack_risk and detect_toxic_flow_risk, so an agent can tell what this tool is and is not.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Clear context for use: point it at the layer that interprets the model response, and it flags parsing of free-text tool calls. It also states the prerequisite (a valid access key, free uses or credits, see POST /crear-llave). It does not explicitly state when to prefer a different detector (e.g. injection vs. hijack vs. spoofing) beyond grouping itself with the other detect_* pattern scanners, so exclusions are implied rather than spelled out.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Try in Browser

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.

Resources