Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden, and it does disclose the two things an agent most needs: the output shape (0-100 score built from four named risk categories) and an access prerequisite with cost implications ('Requiere una llave de acceso válida (usos gratis o créditos) — ver POST /crear-llave'). What it does not state is whether the audit is pure static analysis of the supplied manifest or whether the service fetches/contacts the target server, which matters for a security tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three sentences, front-loaded with what it does and what it returns, followed by when to use it and then the auth requirement. Every sentence carries information, though the auth/credits sentence is appended somewhat abruptly rather than integrated.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a one-parameter aggregate audit with no output schema and no annotations, the definition covers purpose, trigger condition, scoring basis, and access requirement. The main residual gap is the absence of any statement about what the response looks like beyond the scalar score (per-finding breakdown) and whether input is validated.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the single parameter 'manifest' is already documented in the schema as '{ serverInfo, tools: [...] }'. The description restates the same decomposition ('serverInfo + tools[]') and adds nothing beyond it, so the baseline 3 for high-coverage schemas applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Audita el manifiesto de un servidor MCP') and even names the return value (a 0-100 trust score) plus the risk dimensions it aggregates. It does not explicitly contrast itself with the granular sibling detectors (detect_missing_auth_risk, detect_excessive_agency_risk, etc.), so an agent must infer that this is the aggregate audit rather than a single-check tool.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives a concrete trigger: 'Úsalo antes de conectarte a un servidor MCP nuevo o desconocido.' That is clear when-to-use guidance. It stops short of exclusions or naming alternatives (e.g. use the individual detect_* tools when you only care about one risk class), so it falls short of a 5.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.