get_incident_stateGet one Incident State by ID.
Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.
{
"id": 1,
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"arguments": {
"id": "<id>"
},
"name": "get_incident_state"
}
}| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | Yes | ID. | |
| select | No | Omit for all. |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Input schema / properties / id / descriptionPrevious value: -"ID (UUID) of the Incident State."New value: +"ID."Input schema / properties / select / descriptionPrevious value: -"Field names to return. Omit for all readable fields."New value: +"Omit for all."Input schema / properties / id / descriptionPrevious value: -"The unique identifier (UUID) of the Incident State to retrieve. Example: \"550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000\""New value: +"ID (UUID) of the Incident State."Input schema / properties / select / descriptionPrevious value: -"Optional: field names to return for each Incident State (e.g. [\"_id\", \"name\"]). Omit to get all readable fields."New value: +"Field names to return. Omit for all readable fields."Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, destructiveHint=false, and openWorldHint=false, so the safety profile is covered by structured data. The description adds nothing beyond that – no note on not-found behavior, ID format expectations, or whether the record includes related state timelines.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single front-loaded sentence with no filler or repetition of the title's more verbose phrasing. It is efficient, though its brevity borders on under-specification for a fetch tool.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple two-parameter read tool with full annotation coverage and no output schema, the description is just barely sufficient to call correctly. However, it gives no hint about the shape of the returned Incident State or what happens when the ID does not exist.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so both 'id' and 'select' are documented in the schema, and the description merely repeats that a lookup is by ID. It adds no format, example, or semantics for the 'select' field, so the baseline 3 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('Get one Incident State') and scopes it with 'by ID', which distinguishes it from the sibling list_incident_states and count_incident_states. It does not explicitly name those siblings, so it falls short of full differentiation.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The phrase 'by ID' implies a single-record lookup once an ID is known, but there is no explicit when-to-use guidance, no stated alternative (list_incident_states), and no prerequisites. The agent must infer the selection logic entirely from the tool name.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
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