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POST /api/pdf/signing/{id}/finalize

api_post_pdf_signing_id_finalize
Destructive

Existing api/pdf/signing/{id}/finalize API operation. Uses the OneSimpleAPI API (https://onesimpleapi.com/docs), with the same permissions, credits and storage. Supply API parameters in query or body. method defaults to POST. Outputs preserve HTTP status, headers and JSON/text/base64 body; redirects are returned without following them.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "path": "<path>"
    },
    "name": "api_post_pdf_signing_id_finalize"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
bodyNoAPI request body. Nested objects, arrays, HTML, base64 data and all API options retain their original meaning.
pathYes
filesNoMultipart uploads keyed by API field name (for example pdf). Supply file_name, base64 bytes and optional mime_type. Uploads use the existing API file validators.
queryNoURL query parameters. Sensitive API options must be in body as documented by the API.
methodNo
headersNoAPI request headers such as Idempotency-Key, Range and If-None-Match. Authentication and transport headers are managed by the connection.
content_typeNoDefaults to application/json, or multipart/form-data when files are supplied.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

C2.6/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, idempotentHint=false and openWorldHint=true; the description adds genuinely new context by noting shared permissions/credits/storage and that outputs preserve HTTP status, headers and body while redirects are returned unfollowed. It still never says what state change finalize performs or whether it can be undone, which matters most for a destructive tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single tight paragraph with no repetition, and the response-handling detail is useful. The opening clause is filler that duplicates the tool name, but overall nothing is bloated.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

This is a destructive, non-idempotent mutation on a signing workflow, with no output schema and no postconditions described. An agent cannot tell from the definition what finalize does to recipients, whether it is terminal, or what body options (action, append_signing_record) actually control.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 71%, so the baseline is around 3, but the schema's own descriptions are vacuous ("Existing API option; validated by the shared API implementation") for all thirteen duplicated body/query options, so real semantic coverage is far lower. The description's only addition is that parameters may go in query or body, without explaining when to prefer one or what the required path id must reference.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose2/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

"Existing api/pdf/signing/{id}/finalize API operation" restates the path rather than saying what finalizing a signing request does (locks it? produces a final PDF? ends recipient editing?). The agent learns it is a POST against a signing resource with an id, but nothing about the effect, which is the decisive fact for a destructive operation.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

No when-to-use guidance at all, despite siblings such as api_post_pdf_signing_id_send, api_post_pdf_signing_id_cancel and api_patch_pdf_signing_id that an agent would have to disambiguate against. The only instruction is mechanical ("Supply API parameters in query or body. method defaults to POST"), which is invocation plumbing rather than routing advice.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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