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PATCH /api/pdf/signing/{id}

api_patch_pdf_signing_id
Destructive

Existing api/pdf/signing/{id} API operation. Uses the OneSimpleAPI API (https://onesimpleapi.com/docs), with the same permissions, credits and storage. Supply API parameters in query or body. method defaults to PATCH. Outputs preserve HTTP status, headers and JSON/text/base64 body; redirects are returned without following them.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "path": "<path>"
    },
    "name": "api_patch_pdf_signing_id"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
bodyNoAPI request body. Nested objects, arrays, HTML, base64 data and all API options retain their original meaning.
pathYes
filesNoMultipart uploads keyed by API field name (for example pdf). Supply file_name, base64 bytes and optional mime_type. Uploads use the existing API file validators.
queryNoURL query parameters. Sensitive API options must be in body as documented by the API.
methodNo
headersNoAPI request headers such as Idempotency-Key, Range and If-None-Match. Authentication and transport headers are managed by the connection.
content_typeNoDefaults to application/json, or multipart/form-data when files are supplied.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

C2.6/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, idempotentHint=false and openWorldHint=true, and the description adds genuinely useful proxy-level context: credits/storage consumption, that HTTP status/headers/body are preserved, and that redirects are returned unfollowed. However, it never explains what data the destructive PATCH actually alters or what permissions are required, so the most important behavioral question for a destructive write is left unanswered.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Four sentences, front-loaded with the operation and then the transport contract; little waste. The OneSimpleAPI permissions/credits clause borders on boilerplate but carries real cost information, so it earns its place.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, open-world mutation with seven parameters, nested body/query duplication and no output schema, the definition never says what effect the patch has on the signing record. The transport behavior is well covered, but the domain behavior — the part an agent must know before invoking a destructiveHint=true tool — is absent.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 71%, so the baseline is 3, and the description's contribution is limited to saying parameters may go in query or body (plus pointing at the external OneSimpleAPI docs). It adds no meaning for the domain options in the schema — pdf, page, typed, search, action, append_signing_record all remain opaque because their schema descriptions are generic placeholders.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose2/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The sentence "Existing api/pdf/signing/{id} API operation" restates the title (PATCH /api/pdf/signing/{id}) almost verbatim. Nothing in the description explains what a PATCH on a PDF signing resource actually does — update recipients, change signing options, mutate a record — so an agent cannot distinguish its purpose from siblings like api_post_pdf_signing_id_finalize or api_post_pdf_signing_id_send except by guessing from the HTTP verb.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no guidance on when to use this versus the many signing siblings (cancel, finalize, send, resend, GET variants). The only directive is the mechanical "Supply API parameters in query or body," which is about request construction, not tool selection, and no exclusions or preconditions are stated.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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