rotate_webhook_secret
Rotate the signing secret for a webhook. The new secret will only be shown once.
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | Yes | The webhook ID |
Rotate the signing secret for a webhook. The new secret will only be shown once.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | Yes | The webhook ID |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and readOnlyHint=false, so the safety profile is partly covered. The description adds a genuinely important behavioral fact beyond that: the new secret is returned only once and is unrecoverable afterward, which changes how the agent must handle the response. It stops short of saying whether the old secret is invalidated immediately and whether existing webhook consumers break.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two short sentences, front-loaded with the operation and followed by the one critical caveat. Nothing is padded and every clause carries information.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a one-parameter destructive mutation with no output schema, the definition covers the essentials and flags the one-time visibility of the returned secret. The remaining gap is the effect on the previous secret and existing integrations, which matters for a destructive rotation.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100% and the single 'id' parameter is already documented as the webhook ID, so the schema carries the load. The description adds no format, prefix, or lookup guidance beyond it; baseline 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Names a specific verb (rotate) and resource (webhook signing secret), which is immediately separable from the sibling webhook tools (create_webhook, update_webhook, delete_webhook, get_webhook, list_webhooks). No ambiguity about what operation is performed.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description states what happens but gives no guidance on when to rotate versus using update_webhook, nor any prerequisite or trigger condition (e.g. suspected compromise, scheduled rotation). Usage must be inferred entirely from the tool name.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
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