Odile Gate Oversight

Verify a signed audit export

gate_verify_audit_proof

Read-only

Returns intact or broken_at for a supplied signed export; use it to check a gate_export_audit_proof export rather than retrieve audit rows. Recomputes the chain and project signature; broken_at is a one-based row position. Does not approve actions or change permissions.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "project_id": "<project_id>",
      "admin_key": "<admin_key>",
      "proof": "<proof>"
    },
    "name": "gate_verify_audit_proof"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description
`proof`	Yes	The full signed export from gate_audit_proof
`admin_key`	Yes	The project admin key (ga_...). Read it from the .env; never print it.
`project_id`	Yes	The project id from gate_create_project, e.g. p1a2b3...

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedNov 14, 2026

TDQS

A4.3/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint and openWorldHint, and the description adds real substance beyond them: it discloses that the tool recomputes the chain and project signature and that broken_at is a one-based row position. It also clarifies what the call will not do (approve actions, change permissions). It does not say how malformed or unverifiable proofs are reported, so there is a remaining gap.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three compact semicolon-linked clauses: return values first, then usage routing, then the mechanical explanation and scope exclusion. Nothing is repeated and nothing could be removed without losing information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

There is no output schema, so the description must describe return values, and it does so precisely (intact or broken_at, one-based). The nested proof parameter is covered by the schema, and the safety profile is covered by annotations, so an agent has everything needed to invoke and interpret the call.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so project_id, admin_key, and proof are already documented, including the ga_ prefix and the .env sourcing instruction. The description adds only marginal meaning beyond that, chiefly that the 'proof' object is a full signed export whose chain and signature get recomputed. Baseline 3 is appropriate when the schema carries the parameter burden.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb and outcome ("Returns intact or broken_at for a supplied signed export") and immediately distinguishes itself from the sibling that produces the input (gate_export_audit_proof) and from audit-row retrieval. An agent can identify the operation without opening the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It states the positive case (check a gate_export_audit_proof export) and the contrast ("rather than retrieve audit rows"), plus a scope exclusion ("Does not approve actions or change permissions"). The alternative for reading rows is only implied indirectly rather than named, which keeps this just short of explicit when/when-not routing.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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