Odile Gate Oversight

Export a signed audit proof

gate_export_audit_proof

Read-only

Returns chained audit rows, decided-action feature snapshots and signed anchors; use it for a portable tamper-evident export instead of gate_read_audit's recent-call view, then check it with gate_verify_audit_proof. No sealed paths/bodies, notes, keys or IPs in the action labels. Legacy actions lack snapshots and are excluded. store_audit=false has no chain. Follow next_from for audit rows and next_actions_after as actions_after for labels (10,000 each). Use API/SDK to verify exports above the MCP request size limit. The signature is HMAC-SHA256.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "project_id": "<project_id>",
      "admin_key": "<admin_key>"
    },
    "name": "gate_export_audit_proof"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description
`to`	No
`from`	No
`admin_key`	Yes	The project admin key (ga_...). Read it from the .env; never print it.
`project_id`	Yes	The project id from gate_create_project, e.g. p1a2b3...
`actions_after`	No	Action cursor from next_actions_after

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedNov 14, 2026

TDQS

A4.8/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only declare readOnlyHint and openWorldHint; the description adds substantive behavior: what is redacted from labels (sealed paths/bodies, notes, keys, IPs), what is silently excluded (legacy actions without snapshots), the empty-chain condition (store_audit=false), pagination chunk size (10,000), a request-size ceiling requiring API/SDK for large exports, and the HMAC-SHA256 signature. That is far beyond annotation coverage.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

It is front-loaded with the return contents and the sibling comparison before the operational caveats, and nearly every clause carries information. The single dense block is somewhat run-on, and the verification note plus size-limit note could be split for scanability.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description still conveys return shape (rows, snapshots, anchors), signature algorithm, pagination contract, and the downstream verification path. It covers the failure modes an agent needs (legacy exclusion, no chain when store_audit=false, oversized exports) so nothing essential is missing for a 5-parameter read tool.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 60%, and the description compensates by explaining the cursor mechanics: follow next_from for audit rows and feed next_actions_after as actions_after for labels, at 10,000 per page. It does not clarify the from/to range semantics or admin_key scope beyond what the schema already says, leaving a small gap.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

"Returns chained audit rows, decided-action feature snapshots and signed anchors" states a specific verb and enumerates the exact resources returned. It explicitly distinguishes itself from gate_read_audit's "recent-call view," so an agent can choose between the two without opening either schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives an explicit when-to-use ("portable tamper-evident export instead of gate_read_audit's recent-call view") and a named follow-up step ("check it with gate_verify_audit_proof"). It also states when the tool yields less than expected: legacy actions excluded, and store_audit=false has no chain.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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