agents

sign-guard

Pre-sign safety oracle for agent wallets: submit the transaction or EIP-712 message you are about to sign and get a machine-enforceable verdict. Decodes the calldata/typed-data, flags the drainer toolkit (unlimited approvals, setApprovalForAll, permit/permit2 + EIP-3009 to an unexpected party, transferFrom draining an unnamed account, ownership transfer, raw ETH to a stranger), and binds the decoded action to your stated intent - only a fully pinned, clean action is auto-sign-safe. Fails closed: an undecodable on-chain call is cautioned and an unrecognized off-chain signature grant is blocked. Deterministic, sub-second, no endpoint fetch. It vouches that the action matches what you said; it does NOT vouch that a counterparty is trustworthy. [security; up to 200c/call]

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description
`tx`	No	An EVM transaction you are about to sign.
`context`	No	Optional free-form context.
`expected`	No	Your stated intent. Supplying it lets the verdict BIND the action; only a fully bound, clean action is auto-sign-safe. For an allowance, you MUST supply maxAmount; for a transferFrom, supply `from`.
`typedData`	No	An EIP-712 message you are about to sign (the off-chain drainer surface: permit, Permit2, EIP-3009). { domain, types, primaryType, message }.
`spendPolicy`	No	Optional buyer spend policy (context only).

TDQS

A4.6/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description fully discloses behaviors: decodes calldata, flags drainer patterns, binds to intent, auto-sign only for clean pinned actions, fails closed, deterministic, sub-second, no endpoint fetch. No contradictions found.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is efficiently written—each sentence conveys critical information with no filler. It front-loads the purpose and logically flows through capabilities, constraints, and limitations.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Input parameters are well-covered. The lack of an output schema means the agent must infer the verdict structure, though the description gives some hints ('auto-sign-safe', 'cautioned', 'blocked'). A slightly more detailed output format would elevate completeness further.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, but the description adds value by explaining the 'expected' parameter's role (binding action for auto-sign) and highlighting required fields (maxAmount for allowance, from for transferFrom). This goes beyond schema descriptions.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool is a 'Pre-sign safety oracle for agent wallets' that decodes transactions/typed-data and returns a verdict. It distinguishes from siblings like inject-guard or secret-scan by focusing on pre-sign verification, making its purpose specific and unambiguous.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description explains when to use the tool (submit tx or EIP-712 message before signing) and what to expect (fails closed, no counterparty trust). It lacks explicit exclusions or comparisons to alternatives, but the context is clear enough for an agent to decide.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

All agents tools Inspect

Try in Browser

RayrunBuild, deploy, and operate MCP servers without becoming an infrastructure team.ray.runAd

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.

TDQS

A3.8/5.0

Disambiguation5/5

Each tool targets a distinct security domain: prompt injection, secret scanning, code review, transaction safety, tool call safety, and x402 trust audit. Despite overlapping themes, their purposes are clearly differentiated by detailed descriptions.

Naming Consistency3/5

Tool names use a mix of patterns like verb-noun (inject-guard, sign-guard), noun-verb (secret-scan), and noun-noun (pr-summary, x402-trust-audit). The consistent use of lowercase and hyphens helps readability, but the lack of a uniform verb_noun pattern lowers consistency.

Tool Count5/5

Seven tools is a reasonable number for a security-focused server covering multiple guardrails and utilities. Each tool earns its place without overwhelming the agent.

Completeness4/5

The set covers core agent safety areas: input guardrails, secret detection, code review, transaction verification, and tool call safety. The inclusion of a PR summary tool is slightly out of scope, but overall coverage is strong with minor gaps like audit logging.

Resources

Need Help?