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secret-scan

Leaked-credential guardrail for agents: submit a blob you are about to commit, log, post, or hand to another tool (a diff, a config, an .env, an LLM output) and get a machine-enforceable verdict - does it contain a live secret? Detects cloud keys (AWS), VCS tokens (GitHub/GitLab), provider API keys (Stripe, OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Slack), private-key blocks, JWTs, and credentials embedded in URLs, plus high-entropy key=value assignments. Returns a risk level, the detected classes with a MASKED locator (never the secret itself, so the verdict cannot re-leak), and a REDACTED copy safe to emit onward. Deterministic, sub-second, never fetches. Detection of known secret formats - not a proof of cleanliness. [security; up to 200c/call]

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
contentYesThe text to scan for leaked secrets (diff, config, .env, log line, LLM output).

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description fully discloses behavior: deterministic, sub-second, no network fetches, returns masked locators (never the secret), redacted copy, and cost (200c/call). This covers safety, performance, and data handling comprehensively.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is front-loaded with purpose and usage, then details detection capabilities, output, and properties. It is efficient—every sentence adds information without redundancy.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Despite lacking an output schema, the description explains the return values (risk level, detected classes with masked locator, redacted copy) and other traits (determinism, cost). It is fully sufficient for an agent to understand inputs and outputs.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The schema includes a rich description for 'content' that matches the main description almost verbatim. Since schema_description_coverage is 100%, the description adds no extra value beyond what the schema already provides, resulting in baseline 3.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly identifies the tool as a 'Leaked-credential guardrail for agents' and specifies the action (submit a blob, get a verdict). It lists specific detection targets and distinguishes itself from sibling guards by name and function.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description provides concrete scenarios for use (about to commit, log, post, hand to another tool) and mentions limitations ('not a proof of cleanliness'). However, it does not explicitly compare to sibling tools or state when not to use.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.

TDQS

A3.8/5.0
Disambiguation5/5

Each tool targets a distinct security domain: prompt injection, secret scanning, code review, transaction safety, tool call safety, and x402 trust audit. Despite overlapping themes, their purposes are clearly differentiated by detailed descriptions.

Naming Consistency3/5

Tool names use a mix of patterns like verb-noun (inject-guard, sign-guard), noun-verb (secret-scan), and noun-noun (pr-summary, x402-trust-audit). The consistent use of lowercase and hyphens helps readability, but the lack of a uniform verb_noun pattern lowers consistency.

Tool Count5/5

Seven tools is a reasonable number for a security-focused server covering multiple guardrails and utilities. Each tool earns its place without overwhelming the agent.

Completeness4/5

The set covers core agent safety areas: input guardrails, secret detection, code review, transaction verification, and tool call safety. The inclusion of a PR summary tool is slightly out of scope, but overall coverage is strong with minor gaps like audit logging.

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