Radar noEixo

Create portal access

create_portal_access

Destructive

🔐 PORTAL DO CLIENTE — Cria (ou redefine) o acesso de um contato ao portal, onde ELE acompanha os próprios processos e a proposta. O portal fica em /portal/login e usa e-mail e senha próprios, separados do login da equipe. Chamar de novo para o mesmo contato TROCA o e-mail e a senha, sem criar um segundo acesso. A senha é gravada com hash e não pode ser lida depois — guarde-a ao criar. Sem target_user_id, opera na PRÓPRIA conta autenticada.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "email": "<email>",
      "password": "<password>"
    },
    "name": "create_portal_access"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description
`email`	Yes	E-mail de login do cliente no portal.
`phone`	No	Telefone do contato, se não tiver o contact_id.
`password`	Yes	Senha de acesso, mínimo 6 caracteres. Só é vista aqui — depois fica apenas o hash.
`contact_id`	No	ID do contato que terá acesso (via list_contacts). Alternativa: phone.
`target_user_id`	No	ID da conta-alvo (opcional; APENAS o administrador da plataforma pode usar).

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedOct 26, 2026

TDQS

A4.5/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Adds substantial context beyond the destructiveHint annotation: the password is hashed and unreadable afterward (must be saved at creation), re-invocation overwrites credentials, and target_user_id is restricted to platform admins. These disclose the irreversible and admin-gated behaviors that matter for a mutating tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Dense and front-loaded, leading with the resource and the create/redefine behavior. The emoji and header are decorative but the substantive sentences each carry information; only minor tightening is possible.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a mutation tool with no output schema, the description covers the key risks (irreversible password, credential overwrite on re-call, admin restriction). It does not describe the return value or confirmation format, a small remaining gap.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema already documents all parameters at 100% coverage, and the description reinforces meaning: target_user_id is admin-only and optional, and password must be stored because only the hash remains. It adds some interpretation over the schema, though much overlaps with existing field descriptions.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (creates/redefines) and resource (a contact's access to the client portal), and explains what the portal is for (the contact follows their own processes and proposal at /portal/login). This clearly separates it from siblings like list_portal_access and revoke_portal_access.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explains that re-calling for the same contact swaps email and password rather than creating a second access, which tells the agent this doubles as an update. Also clarifies the no-target_user_id default case. It does not explicitly route to alternatives like revoke_portal_access, but the usage context is clear.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

All Radar noEixo tools Inspect

Try in Browser

One endpoint for every MCP toolRayrun runs every MCP server behind one URL and holds the credentials. Each call is decided per client, tool, and argument, then recorded.ray.runAd

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.

Resources

Need Help?